Confronting its Limitations, Failures and the Broken Promise of a ‘Year of Delivery’
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is beset by a confluence of structural, operational, and ethical deficiencies that collectively undermine its legitimacy, efficacy, and relevance within the global diamond industry. These challenges are not merely incidental, but are deeply entrenched in the Kimberley Process’ (KP) institutional framework, rendering it ill-equipped to address the evolving demands of ethical sourcing, transparency and accountability. A critical examination of these issues reveals that the KP’s failures are systemic, necessitating transformative reforms to restore its credibility and ensure its continued relevance.
At the heart of the KP’s internal challenges lies a leadership crisis characterized by poor decision-making, a lack of strategic vision and instances of unethical behavior at the highest levels of governance. These leadership failures are not isolated incidents, but are symptomatic of a broader institutional culture that prioritizes political expediency over ethical rigor. For example, the KP’s inability to address well-documented cases of non-compliance among member states, such as the infiltration of conflict diamonds from regions like the Central African Republic (CAR), demonstrates a systemic failure to enforce its own mandate. This lack of accountability is compounded by operational inefficiencies, including mismanagement and a lack of transparency, which further erode the KP’s credibility.
It is clear that the KP’s over-reliance on consensus-based decision-making exacerbates these issues by stifling critical thinking and suppressing dissenting viewpoints. While consensus is often lauded as a democratic ideal, in practice, it has led to a culture of complacency and inaction, particularly from KP member states. This is evident in the KP’s repeated failure to adopt meaningful reforms, such as expanding its definition of conflict diamonds to include human rights abuses or implementing robust traceability mechanisms. The result is a certification scheme that is increasingly perceived as outdated, ineffective and out of touch with the realities of the modern diamond industry.
Externally, the KP faces mounting skepticism from consumers, civil society organizations (CSOs), and industry stakeholders, who view its failure to address critical issues as a betrayal of its founding principles. The economic downturns and shifting consumer preferences have further exposed the KP’s inadequacies in the most unexpected manner. Younger generations, in particular, are demanding ethically-sourced and sustainably mined diamonds, with many turning to lab-grown alternatives. This shift in consumer behavior underscores the KP’s inability to adapt to changing market dynamics and its failure to provide credible assurances of ethical sourcing.
The rise of independent certification programs and traceability solutions, such as Authentia.io, further highlights the KP’s declining relevance. These initiatives, which leverage blockchain technology and other digital innovations, offer greater transparency and accountability than the KP’s outdated self-regulation model. The European Union’s decision to postpone the implementation of stringent diamond traceability requirements until 2026, a delay that has been widely criticized, serves as a stark reminder of the KP’s inability to drive meaningful change within the industry.
One of the most glaring structural flaws in the KP’s framework is its narrow regulatory scope, which focuses exclusively on rough natural diamonds, while neglecting cut and polished diamonds. This regulatory gap has allowed conflict diamonds to infiltrate the supply chain, undermining the KP’s stated mission of preventing the trade in blood diamonds. The African Diamond Council (ADC) has repeatedly highlighted this issue, noting that participant countries often remain non-compliant while retaining their KP membership. This duality not only undermines the KP’s credibility, but also raises serious questions about its commitment to ethical sourcing.
Moreover, the KP’s failure to address issues such as smuggling and fraudulent certification further erodes its legitimacy. Despite repeated calls for stronger enforcement mechanisms, the KP has consistently failed to take decisive action against non-compliant members. This lack of accountability has created a culture of impunity, in which member states face no meaningful consequences for violating the KP’s guidelines. The ADC’s observation that even self-proclaimed advocates of ethical practices may be complicit in perpetuating the very issues they claim to oppose underscores the need for independent monitoring and oversight.
To restore its credibility and relevance, the KP must undertake a series of comprehensive reforms that address both its internal deficiencies and external challenges. The ineffective certification scheme must expand its definition of conflict diamonds to include human rights abuses, such as forced labor and environmental degradation, which are often associated with diamond mining. This would align the KP’s mandate with contemporary ethical standards and address the growing demand for responsible sourcing. The KP must implement stronger enforcement mechanisms to remove non-compliant members and ensure accountability. This could include the establishment of an independent monitoring body with the authority to investigate and sanction violations, which the ADC is willing to set up and assist with. The KP must adopt digital technologies to enhance transparency and traceability across the entire supply chain. This would not only restore consumer confidence but also provide a credible alternative to independent certification programs. The KP must move beyond self-regulation by member states and establish independent oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance with its guidelines. This would address the inherent conflict of interest that typically arises when member states are responsible for monitoring their own compliance. The KP must engage more effectively with industry stakeholders, including consumers, CSOs and industry professionals, to rebuild trust and foster a culture of accountability. This could include the creation of a multi-stakeholder advisory board to provide input on key decisions.
As I conclude, the current trajectory of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is unsustainable. Its failure to address internal deficiencies, adapt to external challenges, and implement meaningful reforms has rendered it increasingly irrelevant in a rapidly evolving industry. The KP’s desperate plea for support letters entwined with the energy currently being exerted to circulate a strategically planned set of activities that are designed to positively impact the scheme’s reputation or achieve specific objectives will not suffice; only through comprehensive and transformative reforms can the KP hope to regain its credibility and restore confidence among its stakeholders. The time for action is now, as the KP’s continued failure to act will only hasten its decline and further erode trust in the global diamond industry.
