By Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Kimberley Process (KP) Chair 2024 – 2025 and Executive Chairman and CEO of DMCC (Dubai Multi Commodities Centre)

In response to a recent article published on CNBC Africa, titled, ’The Kimberley Process: An Illusion of Ethics?’, I’ve been compelled to pen a response that not only corrects its false narratives and commentary, but also takes the opportunity to clarify certain underlying facts about the KP’s successes, challenges and responsibilities since its foundation, almost 25 years ago. 

Originating in May 2000 in Kimberley, South Africa, as an item on the agenda of the 55^th session of the UN General Assembly, the Kimberley Process (KP) was first discussed as a mechanism to mitigate the damaging social effects of the trade in conflict diamonds, and how a framework could be established to reduce these influences. Three years later, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was launched as a joint government, industry, and civil society initiative that to date, has stemmed the flow of 99.8% of the global production of conflict diamonds.

In the opening paragraph of the ‘Illusion of Ethics’, the writer, Dr. M’zée Fula-Ngenge, chairman of the African Diamond Council, states that the KPCS “is beset by a confluence of structural, operational, and ethical deficiencies that collectively undermine its legitimacy, efficacy, and relevance within the global diamond industry. These challenges are not merely incidental but are deeply entrenched in the Kimberley Process’ (KP) institutional framework, rendering it ill-equipped to address the evolving demands of ethical sourcing, transparency, and accountability. A critical examination of these issues reveals that the KP’s failures are systemic, necessitating transformative reforms to restore its credibility and ensure its continued relevance.”

Underpinned by United Nations mandate, the KPCS is widely documented as the only successful, collaborative effort to reduce the circulation of conflict diamonds from above 15 per cent in the 1990s, to well under 1 per cent today. Additionally, the KPCS is the only reason for an international framework for regulating the trade of rough diamonds. For these reasons alone, I contest that the KPCS’s significant achievements to date, and its ongoing development have only been possible courtesy of its structural, operational, and ethical strengths, which have demonstrably delivered on its mission of stemming the flow of conflict diamonds into wider circulation – a role it continues to fulfil and refine.

Stating that the KP should be “confronting its limitations, failures, and the broken promise of a ‘Year of Delivery’,” I would like to clarify that 2024 included several significant milestones, namely, the admittance of Uzbekistan as a new KP member, and the readmittance of the Central African Republic to the body following its decade-long ban. The ‘Year of Delivery’ also included the UAE’s initiative of a proof-of-concept for the digitalisation of the KP certification process, one of its key objectives.

The author goes on to cite that the KP’s “inability to address well-documented cases of non-compliance among member states, such as the infiltration of conflict diamonds from regions like the Central African Republic (CAR), demonstrates a systemic failure to enforce its own mandate. This lack of accountability is compounded by operational inefficiencies, including mismanagement and a lack of transparency, which further erode the KP’s credibility.”

As one of the KP’s key accomplishments, it was my personal pleasure to visit the CAR on behalf of the KP in order to fast-track the country’s reintegration in light of an improving security situation – an achievement that was not only widely supported by Jaff Bamenjo of the Civil Society Coalition, but also Feriel Zerouki, President of the World Diamond Council.

Moving onto what Dr. Ngenge referred to as the KP’s “over-reliance on consensus-based decision-making [[which]] exacerbates these issues by stifling critical thinking and suppressing dissenting viewpoints”, while consensus can slow decision-making, it is also what makes the Kimberley Process unique as a rare example of what a truly global multi-stakeholder initiative looks like. Without consensus, the process would risk becoming another top-down regulatory body that lacks the buy-in of key participants, particularly diamond-producing nations in Africa. The Kimberley Process was designed to ensure that all voices are heard, including those from artisanal mining communities. A unilateral approach dictated by a few dominant nations (like the G7) would be far less effective and could potentially alienate the very countries that need the KP the most, i.e., Africa’s diamond-producing nations.

Ngenge’s remaining criticisms can be addressed in a single statement, which can also serve as an important reminder to both diamond industry stakeholders and critics, who remain unclear about the KP’s function.

In brief, Ngenge states that “The economic downturns and shifting consumer preferences have further exposed the KP’s inadequacies in the most unexpected manner”, that the “glaring structural flaws in the KP’s framework is its narrow regulatory scope, which focuses exclusively on rough natural diamonds” and “the KP’s failure to address issues such as smuggling and fraudulent certification.”

It has become common place among detractors to criticise the KP for not being a universal solution for the diamond sector’s global challenges, including, as illustrated by Dr. Ngenge’s comment, what it’s not mandated to do. As a result, I feel this is a timely opportunity to remind the international community that one of the KP’s many key strengths is its function of fitting into a far wider network of organisations that play complementary roles in ethical diamond sourcing.

Let me be absolutely clear: The Kimberley Process was never designed to be a global financial watchdog, an anti-money laundering agency, or a tax enforcement mechanism. Expecting the KP to solve challenges outside its jurisdiction is as illogical as blaming Interpol for failing to regulate corporate tax fraud. Yet, the debate surrounding the KP has taken on an emotional tone, particularly in claims that it is a “massive greenwashing operation” or that it “certifies blood diamonds as legitimate.” These statements are false and misleading. They do not serve the interests of responsible stakeholders seeking real reform. For the sake of clarity, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) focuses on the trade of rough diamonds, not polished diamonds. Once rough diamonds are cut and polished, they fall outside the scope of the KPCS.

While I am in admiration of Dr. Ngenge’s commitment to transparency, I am concerned about his promotion of Authentia.io, a yet-to-be-developed traceability platform for which he has claimed to have worked with its developers over the past three-and-a-half years. While this may be true, it indicates a clear conflict of interest, with his ADC standing to gain from its implementation. By positioning the ADC as an authority in diamond traceability while promoting a specific platform, I have several concerns about whether his advocacy is driven by industry ethics or business interests.

Contrary, Dr. Ngenge fails to recognise the Kimberley Process’s recent advances in digitalisation and traceability, particularly through its Verifico platform. Currently in proof-of-concept for digitalisation of the KP, Verifico represents a major step forward in strengthening supply chain integrity by leveraging modern technology. By implementing blockchain and other digital tools, Verifico enhances the tracking and certification of diamonds, making it more difficult for illicit stones to enter the legitimate supply chain. Ignoring this development significantly undermines the credibility of arguments that the KP is outdated or ineffective.

Towards the end of the article, Dr. Ngenge states that “The KP must implement stronger enforcement mechanisms to remove non-compliant members and ensure accountability. This could include the establishment of an independent monitoring body with the authority to investigate and sanction violations, which the ADC is willing to set up and assist with.”

This neatly brings me onto the credibility of Dr. Ngenge and the African Diamond Council.

In the world of African diamond governance, two organisations are often erroneously confused: the African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA) and the African Diamond Council (ADC). While the ADPA is indisputably recognised as the legitimate intergovernmental body for African diamond-producing nations, the ADC remains a lesser-known and often controversial entity. At the centre of the ADC is Dr. Ngenge, a self-proclaimed diamond industry strategist who has made bold claims about his role in shaping the industry, including asserting that he was instrumental in the formation of the DMCC (Dubai Multi Commodities Centre). However, the truth about the ADC, its legitimacy, and Dr. Ngenge’s claims reveal inconsistencies, self-promotion, and potential vested interests.

The African Diamond Council presents itself as “Africa’s official diamond governing body”, supposedly composed of the heads-of-state from Africa’s diamond-producing countries. It claims to have been founded in January 2000 in Luanda, Angola, with a mission to regulate Africa’s diamond trade. It also frequently positions itself as the supreme authority, even referring to the ADPA as “a continental branch of ADC”. However, no legal or governmental documentation supports this claim.

Unlike ADPA, an intergovernmental body, formally recognised as one of the KP’s Observer Groups, the ADC is not officially acknowledged by any major international regulatory body. It operates as a private advocacy group, relying on self-proclaimed authority rather than government backing. The African Union and other multinational African institutions do not officially recognise the ADC, and there is no evidence of heads-of-state formally convening under the ADC’s leadership.

The African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA), on the other hand, was officially established in 2006 via the Luanda Declaration and serves as a recognised intergovernmental organisation headquartered in Angola. It consists of the mining ministers from its member states and represents African diamond-producing nations in global forums. It also actively participates in the Kimberley Process, influencing policies that govern the trade of rough diamonds. In total, ADPA includes at least 15 African nations, including major producers such as Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

In contrast, the ADC has no formal government membership and is not involved in policy-making. Additionally, it isn’t listed as an observer in the Kimberley Process and holds no official standing in diamond trade governance. Its underlying authority and credibility comes almost exclusively from self-published materials and the reputation of its chairman, Dr. Ngenge.

In his capacity as chairman of the ADC, Dr. Ngenge has presented himself as an influential figure in African diamond policy. Previous claims include pivotal roles in:

• The establishment of the Kimberley Process (KP) – he states that he was “Chief Administrative Developer” in 2000 and “Project Launch Team Coordinator” in 2001.
• Shaping Dubai’s diamond industry and founding DMCC – he has asserted that he was a “principal trustee and decisive proponent” in forming the DMCC (Dubai Multi Commodities Centre) in 2002.
• Advocating for diamond traceability and governance reforms – he promotes the ADC as a leading authority in shaping Africa’s diamond sector.

While his involvement in early Kimberley Process discussions may be partially accurate, there is no tangible evidence to support this claim – nor is there any verifiable evidence to support his claims regarding the formation of DMCC.

DMCC (Dubai Multi Commodities Centre) was established in May 2002 by a royal decree issued by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Ruler of Dubai. The official DMCC narrative credits Dubai’s leadership and executives, including myself, as the primary forces behind its creation. Nowhere in DMCC’s official records, government statements, or founding documents does Dr. Ngenge’s name appear.

DMCC categorically denies Dr. Ngenge’s involvement in its founding or the establishment of the Dubai Diamond Exchange. Courtesy of these revelations, I am pleased to confirm that Rough & Polished has deleted its reference to Dr. Ngenge’s false claim about DMCC from the English version of its website.

While I cannot speak for the reasons behind Ngenge’s OpEd, his outspoken criticism coincides with his attempts to participate in the KP’s Intersessional meeting in May 2024, where he was removed by security for attempting to enter closed sessions without verifiable invitation.

In the same way that the KP should be held to account and scrutiny, the industry should also pay close attention to those that criticise it, including their status, credibility, and potential motivations for undermining it. While I will be the first to admit that no organisation is perfect, the KP’s empirical status as the only vehicle of collaborative efficacy in the diamond industry’s global fight against conflict diamonds should not be underestimated, nor disposed of due to ‘room for improvement’.

As we continue with the ‘Year of Best Practice’, I once again look forward to welcoming back all credible members of the diamond community, where we will continue to uphold our mission in stemming conflict diamonds from our global supply chains.