<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="820" height="546" src="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20324205860_e48be646b9_o-820x546.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-412812" srcset="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20324205860_e48be646b9_o-820x546.jpg 820w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20324205860_e48be646b9_o-300x200.jpg 300w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20324205860_e48be646b9_o-135x90.jpg 135w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20324205860_e48be646b9_o-768x511.jpg 768w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20324205860_e48be646b9_o-1536x1022.jpg 1536w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20324205860_e48be646b9_o-scaled.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 820px) 100vw, 820px" /><figcaption>Xhosa women, Eastern Cape, South Africa Photo: via Flickr</figcaption></figure>



Dr. Nicoline de Haan, Director of the <a href="https://gender.cgiar.org/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">CGIAR GENDER Platform</a>



The lingering Covid-19 pandemic has provided the starkest preview of a planet pushed to its limits, the margins of which are narrowing further because of climate change.



The knee-jerk responses to Covid-19 around the world have, in many cases, reinforced endemic inequalities. For rural women, these reactions have often been as&nbsp;<a href="https://actionaid.org/news/2020/world-food-day-women-farmers-most-risk-covid-19-food-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">dangerous</a>&nbsp;as the coronavirus itself, exposing them to increased hunger, poverty and risks of gender-based violence.



It is becoming increasingly clear that routinely ignoring gender biases amplifies existing inequalities, setting back not only women, but everyone, and worsening global challenges for all. As the world begins to emerge from the pandemic, governments and leaders have an opportunity to proactively minimise future crises by bringing rural women’s voices to the forefront.



Across the Global South, this means ensuring that rural women have the chance to articulate their needs and influence every decision and policy, including those deployed in haste as part of crisis relief and response.



Rural women were the hardest hit by the pandemic, not because they were most susceptible to the virus, but because pandemic-related policies and restrictions paid little heed to their challenges of accessing fields, markets and assets to continue to earn a living and feed their families.



With the world now facing a yet more prolonged crisis, under&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/2021/08/09/ar6-wg1-20210809-pr/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">a temperature rise of more than 1.5C</a>, governments must learn the lessons of decisions that overlook rural women or face the even larger cost of letting them – and society &#8211; down on a greater scale.



One crucial aspect for policymakers is to better understand the role and value of rural women’s assets like livestock and land, and agricultural inputs like seeds and fertilizer, to be better positioned to adopt policies that do not undermine or compromise them.



Most women smallholders already start from a disadvantaged position, with&nbsp;gender gaps in land tenure particularly stark. Men represent between&nbsp;<a href="http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/data-map/statistics/en/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">70&nbsp;and 90&nbsp;per cent&nbsp;of landowners</a>&nbsp;in most countries, and as many as&nbsp;<a href="https://www.oecd.org/publications/sigi-2019-global-report-bc56d212-en.htm" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">29 countries</a>&nbsp;deny widows and daughters the same rights as their male relatives to inherit land and non-land assets.



To ensure national decisions and policies do not adversely impact women’s access to land and other assets, or force them to sell their animals to cope with crises, governments need&nbsp;<a href="https://gender.cgiar.org/news-events/improved-data-collection-could-pinpoint-promising-strategies-womens-empowerment-through" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">more and better data</a>&nbsp;on what assets women have and how they use them.



A second key factor is the provision of financial services, aid and benefits for the most vulnerable, including rural women.



For example,&nbsp;<a href="http://gender.cgiar.org/covidpolicies" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">a new study</a>&nbsp;of three African countries found that Senegal’s covid-related movement restrictions prevented women in agri-business, such as those involved in small-scale fishing, from accessing fish farms and markets as normal. This reduced not only their livelihoods and food security, but also those of their families and communities.



In response, the Rapid Entrepreneurship Delegation fund developed and implemented gender-responsive financial support targeting Very Small, Small and Medium Enterprises facing difficulties related to the pandemic.&nbsp;Women fish sellers were offered unsecured loans&nbsp;– or “nano-loans” &#8211; that did not require collateral, ranging from 10,000 to 300,000 CFA francs (US$17-530) with daily or weekly repayments options.



While this retrospective assistance provided a crucial lifeline for women impacted by pandemic restrictions, a more efficient approach might have involved consulting with women at the outset to either adapt the restrictions or offset their impact with upfront support.



This can be achieved by offering rural women loans requiring no collateral,&nbsp;loans with low-interest or longer repayment periods,&nbsp;or tailoring banking services to their realities, which may include limited literacy or access to technology.



Finally, government departments must develop strategies to always include rural women&nbsp;in policy-making processes, so that any response to a crisis does not need to be retrofitted to address both women and men’s needs equally.



Women’s organisations that are usually the first responders for community issues could be an entry point for identifying the audiences and demographics to engage, for example.



Investing in women’s leadership, particularly in rural areas, is another way to encourage women to empower themselves and speak on behalf of their constituents.



And making the use of gender analysis and data divided by gender and age the norm in policy development is crucial. These tools will help shape the design of response measures that reflect and address the differentiated needs and priorities of rural women and men.



But first and foremost, it is essential that governments recognise that women, especially those in rural areas, are among the most vulnerable groups in society&nbsp;because they are often the most excluded from decision-making and decisions.



As a result, authorities are often left playing catch up to redress the imbalance retrospectively.



At best, such an approach is inefficient because it requires additional resources to address an ever-widening gender gap. And at worst, it undermines gender equality, basic human rights and the prospects of everyone from families to communities to entire economies.



The pandemic should be the wake-up call needed to start listening to rural women before the next crisis makes it too late.



Ends

20324205860_e48be646b9_o

Listening to rural women should be the first defence against crises, not a last resort

Africa-report

A Just Transition for Africa: Championing a Fair and Prosperous Pathway to Net Zero

*This analysis was produced by the team at Signal Risk



Sudanese military chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, claimed on 26 September that soldiers under his charge repelled on 25 September an attempted incursion by Ethiopian forces.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-seizing-a-crisis">Seizing a crisis</h2>



According to the general, Ethiopian personnel attempted to seize territory in the Umm Barakit area of the disputed al-Fashqa border region, taking advantage of the instability in Sudan caused by the recent coup attempt. However, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) acted swiftly, prompting the Ethiopian troops to retreat. Al-Burhan concluded his statement by noting that &#8220;[we] will not allow the Ethiopian forces to enter al-Fashqa after reclaiming the territory&#8221;.



Al-Burhan’s claims of an Ethiopian incursion have yet to be verified by sources outside of Sudan. His counterparts in the Ethiopian military also failed to respond to requests for commentary; however, Ethiopian government sources quoted by the al-Jazeera news outlet categorically denied Burhan’s claims, stating that “we deny the movement of our forces on the Sudanese border or their incursion into any area&#8221;.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Taking the gap</h2>



The purported Ethiopian incursion into Sudanese-held territory in al-Fashqa is by no means unprecedented. Armed forces belonging to both countries have made a habit of taking advantage of “strategic openings” in order to annex more territory in the prized food-growing region. Previously, Ethiopian authorities – and in particular, those from the Amhara region, which have the most intense interest in al-Fashqa – have accused the SAF of leveraging vacuums left by their redeployment to Ethiopia’s Tigray region as a means to seize more territory. Specifically, in December 2020 when Amharan forces were redeployed from al-Fashqa to counteract the dissident Tigray People&#8217;s Liberation Front (TPLF), the SAF quickly claimed all areas that were vacated by the Amharans.



Like their Ethiopian counterparts, the Sudanese have denied any wrongdoing on their part in the broader tussle over al-Fashqa. Commenting on the December territorial annexation, Sudanese prime minister Abdalla Hamdok stated that “we want our relationship to be good with Ethiopia, but we will not give up an inch of Sudan’s land”. Hamdok’s bullishness is understood to be rooted in the notion that Khartoum has a superior claim to al-Fashqa than Addis Ababa. In the most recent settlement on the area, concluded in 2008, Ethiopia formally recognised Sudan’s sovereignty over al-Fashqa, in return for then-leader Omar al-Bashir allowing Amharan settlers to remain in the area. However, changes in government in Ethiopia and Sudan have seen the settlement collapse.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">An impending war</h2>



The sabre-rattling and military manoeuvring have given rise to concerns over full-blown conflict between the two countries, in a horn-of-Africa region where territorial disputes have a tendency of sparking wars; the 1998 Ethiopian-Eritrean border war over a less lucrative Badme region is a case in point. Fearing a similar outcome, countries with elevated interests in the region have attempted to negotiate peace. In August, Turkey – which is becoming a dominant player in the region – offered to mediate the dispute over al-Fashqa during a meeting between General al-Burhan and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While Sudan agreed to Turkish mediation, Ethiopia ignored the offer.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Mutual destabilisation</h2>



The dispute over al-Fashqa is not the only development that is tarnishing relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. Just as concerning are claims by Ethiopian officials that Sudan is actively arming and shielding Tigray and Oromo forces that are attempting to overthrow the government of Abiy Ahmed.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Support subversion</h2>



Specifically, Ethiopian officials claimed in September that Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) militiamen were utilising refugee camps in Sudan as training and recruitment facilities. They were then crossing into Ethiopia using identity cards issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This, according to the Ethiopian authorities, was part of a



strategy by the TDF and OLA to expand the Tigray conflict into the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regions.



Interestingly, the allegations by Ethiopian authorities were somewhat corroborated by the United Nations (UN). An UNHCR official quoted on 07 September by the France24 publication stated that “the agency was aware of reports alleging Ethiopian refugees registered in Sudan were now involved in the conflict”. However, the official noted that he and the UN agency were “not in a position to verify” these claims.



Prior to that, in May, Ethiopian general Tesfaye Ayalew made similar accusations. Speaking at the time to the Ethiopian Fana Broadcasting Corporation, Ayalew claimed that as many as 320 TDF fighters attempted to cross from Sudan into Ethiopia near the Tigray region town of Humera. They were either killed, captured, or died of thirst in the arid area.



Unsurprisingly, Sudan has repeatedly denied claims that it is supporting destabilising forces in Ethiopia. In fact, Sudan has gone as far as insinuating that Ethiopia has shunned its efforts to broker peace between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). On 08 August, Sudanese prime minister Hamdok rebuked Ethiopia and recalled the country’s ambassador to Addis Ababa after his counterpart, Abiy Ahmed, suggested that Sudan was not a credible party to facilitate negotiations between the government and Tigray leaders.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Fraught frenemies</h2>



Like the tensions over al-Fashqa, the claims of subversion are not without precedent; especially in the post-colonial era, during which both countries have supported subversive elements. Most notably, Ethiopia’s government under the Marxist dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, provided military support to the South Sudanese SPLM/A movement, which at the time was fighting to secede from Sudan. This continued until the late 1990s and South Sudan’s eventual secession in 2011; although in the latter stages of the SPLM/A’s struggle, Ethiopia’s backing was more technical than operational in nature.



In turn, Sudan supported the TPLF, which eventually overthrew Mengistu’s so-called Derg regime in 1991. More recently, Sudan was one of the few countries that openly engaged with the Eritrean regime of Isaias Afwerki to the ire of Ethiopia. However, relations thawed somewhat from 2011 onwards.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The dam squabble</h2>



The security-related concerns occur against the backdrop of a geo-economic dispute over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Efforts by Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, and the wider international community to establish a treaty on the reservoir prior to the second-stage filling were fruitless, with Ethiopia completing the process in early July without a legally binding agreement. Expectedly, the move was rejected by Sudan and Egypt, with Khartoum accusing Ethiopia of “attempting to impose fait accompli policies and ignore both downstream countries legitimate interests and serious concerns”.



Historically, it has been presumed that tensions over the GERD centred on issues pertaining to the operation and filling of the dam, the potential for water-sharing talks, the establishment of a conflict resolution mechanism, and technical issues related to drought periods and data exchange. While somewhat true, there appears to be a more significant issue under contention – the share of Nile waters that countries are entitled to. This was brought to the fore by Abiy Ahmed in his visit to Uganda in August, during which he called on upstream countries that have not signed or ratified the Nile River Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), also known as the Entebbe Agreement, to do so quickly.



Drafted in 2010 – and signed by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi (six out of the ten Nile Basin countries) – the Entebbe Agreement was intended by upstream countries to replace the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. This was on the basis that the colonial framework afforded downstream countries like Egypt and Sudan a disproportionate share of the Nile’s waters; Egypt was allotted 55.5 billion cubic metres of water per year, and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic metres per year. Unsurprisingly, Egypt and Sudan have fiercely rejected the Entebbe Agreement and lobbied against the assent of other Nile basin countries, leading to its side-lining. However, with the advent of the GERD and growing concerns over water security in the Nile Basin, talk of finalising the Entebbe Agreement and ensuring more equitable water quotas has gained momentum. Expediently, Ethiopia has seemingly



leveraged such contentions and their resonance among Nile Basin countries as reason to flout a concrete agreement with Sudan and Egypt.



Fearing further deterioration, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called on 15 September for a resumption of negotiations led by the African Union (AU), with a goal of reaching a binding agreement within a reasonable time frame. All three stakeholders have yet to respond to the UNSC directive; however, historically, Ethiopia has previously endorsed an AU-led initiative, while Sudan and Egypt have opposed it.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Assessment</h2>



Recent developments underscore the complexity and fragility of relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. While this can be traced to a complicated history and deep-seated mistrust, such fault lines have been compounded recently by a zero-sum position on key issues, as a result of the political interests of Abiy Ahmed and Abdalla Hamdok. In an Ethiopian landscape where his governance faces myriad existential threats, Ahmed has a strong incentive to be bellicose towards any external party that threatens Ethiopian interests (mainly as a deterrent to both internal and external dissidents). In assuming such a posture, he also sends a strong signal to his base and Ethiopians at large regarding the ends to which he is willing to go in order to protect their interests, thereby guaranteeing domestic support for his administration. In this narrow context, it is rational for Ahmed to remain uncooperative in the al-Fashqa dispute given its importance to the Amharans (who are among his foremost backers) and the tussle over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is central to the country’s growth and development prospects. Hamdok faces similar pressure to exude strength, not only as a deterrent to elements aligned with former president Omar al-Bashir, but also to demonstrate to the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the broad Sudanese population that he is a sturdy leader who is willing to safeguard their interests. Like his Ethiopian counterpart, this narrow context makes it somewhat rational for Hamdok to maintain Sudan’s current position.



In light of the prevailing dynamics and historical precedent, allegations that Sudan is aiding the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) cannot be dismissed. In addition to the insinuations made by Ethiopian officials, a key concern among observers of the conflict in Tigray is how the TPLF has been able to maintain its campaign for such a protracted period in the absence of formal channels for funding and weapons procurement. Naturally, this supports the assumption that the TPLF must be receiving some support from external parties. While yet to be fully confirmed, it is not entirely implausible that Sudan – and possibly Egypt – is backing the TPLF. Sudan arguably has some interest in seeing the conflict in the Tigray region metastise and the Abiy Ahmed administration weakened. If the conflict extends to Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region and the GERD is disrupted, it will ease Sudan’s worries over water security. Furthermore, a weaker Abiy Ahmed administration – perhaps through some settlement that dilutes the influence of the Amharan contingent in the federal government – could see Ethiopia take a softer position on the al-Fashqa dispute. At present, there is no evidence to suggest that Ethiopia is supporting any anti-government elements in Sudan. However, should there be more credible proof that Sudan is backing dissident elements in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa may respond in kind by supporting Bashir-linked elements, including within the Sudanese military, who have demonstrated their intent to subvert Sudan’s Sovereign Council-led transitional government.



In the near term, bilateral relations between Sudan and Ethiopia will remain fractured, with the possibility of further deterioration. This will be primarily driven by Hamdok’s political calculus amid emerging challenges to his leadership. Unlike Ahmed, who was recently re-elected on the back of a landslide victory, Hamdok’s position is far less secure. As noted, the Sudanese prime minister faces a trifecta of pressures from the TMC, Bashir-aligned elements, and a political opposition that is growing exasperated with the country’s quasi-militaristic rule. To withstand such pressures and avoid any negative shifts in public opinion, Hamdok may be forced to maintain a hard-line stance, especially towards external rivals. As such, Sudan may be reluctant to engage in any negotiations over GERD and al-Fashqa. At worst, this will stall the establishment of any treaty on the reservoir and incentivise further tit-for-tat skirmishes in al-Fashqa. However, full-blown conflict between the two countries is still unlikely.



In the longer term, there is the possibility of a general improvement in relations based on the fact that the benefits of cooperation far outweigh those of conflict. A belligerent stance may satisfy short-term political agendas; however, a long-term adversarial stance is counterproductive. In general, constant tensions (and full-blown conflict) are highly undesirable for two countries that are facing myriad social, political, and economic challenges. Given these fault lines, more significant conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan could be multi-layered and subject both governments to internal and external threats. Such an outcome is also undesirable for the region at large – and the international community – given the risk of wider fragmentation in a highly strategic region. Any war between the two countries would necessarily drag in other actors such as Egypt and possibly Kenya. In contrast, there is more to gain for all parties from rapprochement. The GERD is a case in point. Sudan could benefit by way of cheap and reliable energy exports from the reservoir, while Ethiopia would have a consistent client and source of revenue in Sudan. There is also room to resolve the al-Fashqa dispute in an amicable manner by reinstating the former Bashir-era agreement, which held firmly for more than a decade. Such considerations – of the benefits of peace and the cost of war – are one of several reasons why the two countries have exercised restraint to date.



Steady long-term relations between Ethiopia and Sudan will necessarily require external intervention and trade-offs by both governments on key diplomatic issues. Positively, after securing re-election, the Abiy Ahmed administration may be slightly more amenable to the required trade-offs. Ahmed could demand Sudanese endorsement for the Entebbe Agreement and African Union-led negotiations on the GERD, in exchange for Ethiopia’s recognition of Sudanese sovereignty over the al-Fashqa region. What is equally positive is a more active foreign policy by the United States (US) under President Joe Biden, especially in the Horn of Africa region. The US, which has strong influence over Sudan and Ethiopia, can leverage its institutional power to steer both countries away from further escalation and ensure that agreements are upheld. It will also be necessary to ward off any spoilers (like Egypt) which have an interest in maintaining frosty relations between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Signal Risk on troubled lands, troubled waters

<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="820" height="547" src="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/25392653883_c566caf364_o-820x547.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-412680" srcset="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/25392653883_c566caf364_o-820x547.jpg 820w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/25392653883_c566caf364_o-300x200.jpg 300w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/25392653883_c566caf364_o-135x90.jpg 135w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/25392653883_c566caf364_o-768x513.jpg 768w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/25392653883_c566caf364_o-1536x1025.jpg 1536w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/25392653883_c566caf364_o-scaled.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 820px) 100vw, 820px" /><figcaption>Women of Color in Tech stock images, Women in Tech stock images Photo: via Flickr</figcaption></figure>



In a hyper connected and increasingly digitized global landscape, human connection and interaction has been, and continues to be, transformed. Information communication technologies (ICTs) have acted as an enabler to the human experience in many ways: revolutionizing healthcare delivery through <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/medical-delivery-drones-coronavirus-africa-us/">drones</a> in remote geographic spaces, facilitating online shopping and bolstering communication. However, on the same vein, ICTs have in other ways revealed the ways in which inequalities (if unaddressed) can be precipitated by the proliferation of ICTs.



The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the need for people to be digitally networked. Education, employment and other activities migrated almost exclusively online overnight. Those without digital connection were left out and, as a result, livelihoods for many were lost.



With limited job opportunities in <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/03/c_139718446.htm">Botswana</a>, and in Africa more generally, some people resort to grassroots <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31421/135420-ProfitingfromParityFullReport.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">entrepreneurship</a> out of necessity for their livelihoods. The nature of their entrepreneurial activities require social interaction – some as street vendors in bustling roads and alleys. Many of these individual merchants and grassroots entrepreneurs are women. During the peak of the pandemic, particularly the lockdown periods, many grassroots entrepreneurial activities for these women were halted in the then silent streets. It is reported that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/102008/how-covid-19-disproportionately-affected-women-led-businesses/">disproportionate</a> adverse effect on women entrepreneurs.



Africa has the world’s highest numbers of female entrepreneurs. And according to the Mastercard <a href="https://newsroom.mastercard.com/mea/press-releases/africa-claims-top-three-spots-in-mastercard-index-for-highest-concentration-of-women-businesses-owners-in-the-world/">Index</a>, Botswana in particular, has the second highest number of female business owners in the world, just behind Uganda. Botswana’s female business owners have shown an increase over the past years from ranking 36% in the MasterCard Index in 2019 to 38.5% in 2020.



As Africa, and Botswana specifically, gears itself to building back better post COVID-19, digital technologies provide <a href="https://www.oecd.org/digital/bridging-the-digital-gender-divide.pdf">new pathways</a> for entrepreneurial empowerment for women. Women’s digital entrepreneurship is a key driver of socio-economic development in Botswana, Southern Africa, Africa in general and indeed the world. The female economy is <a href="https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-and-women-africa-join-forces-promote-womens-digital-skills-and-entrepreneurship-across#:~:text=According%20to%20McKinsey%2C%20the%20female,community%2C%20country%20and%20continental%20level.">said</a> to be “the world’s largest emerging market, with the potential to add $12trillion to global GDP by 2025”.



Digital transformation offers unique <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/28/we-have-a-duty-to-build-a-better-post-pandemic-digital-world">opportunities</a> for entrepreneurial women and opens them up to a digital world where access to information, innovative business ideas and employment opportunities are at their grasp. Technology and innovation play a vital role in achieving gender equality in a world inundated with gender-related economic and social biases and challenges. The opportunities provided by technology and ICTs for women entrepreneurs are in digital commerce, digital services and other novel entrepreneurial opportunities that will continue to unfold. It is therefore vital that access to ICTs are provided to women so as to ensure that digital solutions and the efficiencies they provide enable women to thrive in their micro, small and/or medium-sized entrepreneurial ventures.



Botswana’s burgeoning women entrepreneurs are important drivers and contributors of the country’s sustainable socio-economic growth. Innovative business ventures with digital solutions are important in a post-pandemic era and gender-sensitive national domestic policies that consider gender disparities will ensure the equitable inclusion of women in Botswana’s developmental strategy. The African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36195-doc-au_strategy_for_gender_equality_womens_empowerment_2018-2028_report.pdf">Strategy</a> for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment takes particular note of including women in the developmental strategy of the African continent.



How can Botswana, and Africa at large, move towards gender equality through digital entrepreneurship where pre-existing socio-economic inequalities are seeping into the digital space? This can be done through: digital literacy interventions, targeted investment programmes, gender sensitive domestic policies and digital cooperation.



<ul class="wp-block-list" type="1"><li>Digital Literacy</li></ul>



There is a <a href="https://paradigmhq.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/lr-Botswana-Digital-Rights-Inclusion-2020-Report.pdf">dearth</a> of disaggregated data to understand the extent of the current gender digital divide in Botswana. Globally, there are <a href="https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/GSMA-Connected-Women-The-Mobile-Gender-Gap-Report-2019.pdf">433 million women</a> who are unconnected to ICTs and <a href="https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/GSMA-The-Mobile-Gender-Gap-Report-2020.pdf">165 million less females</a> who are owners of a mobile phone in comparison to men. There are also <a href="https://www.bmz.de/en/news/publications/publikationen-reihen/materialie350-women-in-tech-23696">250 million</a> more men who use the internet compared to women.



A digital rights activist in Botswana, Agang Ditlhogo expressed the importance of introducing digital products at any early age, especially for women. Ditlhogo said to me: “Early child digital literacy will empower young future innovators with digital skills. And this will allow them to contribute to their communities and global tech advancements”.



She further said: “Digital literacy is generally low in Botswana. The inequalities in digital access further increase for rural or remote areas especially for women and girls”. As a co-founder of an ICT academy for children and teens, <a href="https://twitter.com/clickinggen?lang=en">The Clicking Generation</a>, Ditlhogo said, “Stakeholders across the [African] continent need to be intentional with programmes that address the current gaps in tech. There is a need for resourcing (computer equipment, curriculum, affordable internet access)”.



Digital literacy and access to ICTs is an avenue towards digital skilling for women and girls both in urban and rural areas; and starting this at an early age will shape their use of digital tools to support their micro, small or medium-sized enterprises.



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Targeted Investment Mechanisms</li></ul>



While women entrepreneurs in Botswana and Africa continues to increase, one of the <a href="https://ideas4development.org/en/ffemale-entrepreneurship-key-ingredient-africa-growth/">challenges</a> they face is a <a href="https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-and-women-africa-join-forces-promote-womens-digital-skills-and-entrepreneurship-across">lack of sufficient capital</a> to start, sustain and scale their businesses which has resulted in <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/913901553025974609/executive-summary">lower profits</a> in both the short and long-term as <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/913901553025974609/executive-summary">compared</a> to their male counterparts.&nbsp;



Efforts such as those by the African Development Bank’s Gender Equality Trust <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/news-keywords/gender-equality-trust-fund-getf">Fund</a> – targeted investment mechanisms – are necessary to counteract the lack of financial investment women entrepreneurs in Africa face. However, more of this targeted approach and support is necessary from <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/avivahwittenbergcox/2021/09/30/investing-in-africa-invest-in-women/?sh=17af53a1d097">private sector investors</a>, including tech companies, to <a href="https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-and-women-africa-join-forces-promote-womens-digital-skills-and-entrepreneurship-across">invest</a> in female digital entrepreneurship.&nbsp;



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Gender-sensitive and Intentional Policies</li></ul>



There are strides to bridge the gender digital divide and increase women and girls’ participation in the digital sphere. One such example is the <a href="https://www.eskills4girls.org/about/">#eSkills4Girls</a> initiative that was established under the German G20 Presidency.



Ditlhogo, the founder of the ICTs academy for children and teens in Botswana, explained to me that generally, on a day-to-day basis, her digital academy “has more boys registering for the programs than girls”. However, in sponsored programs such as the work she had under the #eSkills4Girls initiative, sponsored by the German Government, “the donor-sponsored training insisted that at least 51% of learners trained be girls”. Such intentional efforts to digitally empower women and girls are important and should also take place at the domestic-policy level.



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Digital Cooperation</li></ul>



Geopolitical competition has in some ways contributed to digital <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/28/we-have-a-duty-to-build-a-better-post-pandemic-digital-world">polarisation</a>. It is important to have digital cooperation at the international governmental level as well as at the company level. Cooperation at the governmental level is important to safeguard against international cybercrimes and for governments to dialogue on how digitalisation will impact public international law.



At the private sector level, digital cooperation should take the form of ensuring that digital solutions and innovations also cater for the <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/5/op-ed-ed-phumzile-covid-19-and-the-digital-gender-divide">low-income strata</a> of society.



Digital cooperation between the public (governments) and private sector (companies) is also important in building partnerships for the required but lacking <a href="https://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/working-groups/DigitalMoonshotforAfrica_Report.pdf">digital infrastructure</a> in African countries to bridge the digital connectivity gap and have universal access.



Women in Africa, including in Botswana in particular, are part of the <a href="https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-and-women-africa-join-forces-promote-womens-digital-skills-and-entrepreneurship-across">world’s largest emerging market</a> – the global female economy. As such they are an important resource who should be supported in the ways highlighted above to harness technology and digitalisation so that they chart their own digital entrepreneurial paths towards gender equality in the digital future.&nbsp;



* Mary-Jean Nleya is the founder and editor of&nbsp;<a href="http://www.theglobalcommunique.com/">The Global Communiqué</a>&nbsp;. She was recently on a Grassroots Reporting project in Malawi. She is an Emerging Leader alumnus and was invited to attend the Atlantic Dialogues in Marrakech, Morocco – organized by the OCP Policy Center in partnership with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Follow on&nbsp;twitter:&nbsp;<a href="https://twitter.com/thegloco">@thegloco</a>&nbsp;.

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Op-Ed: Towards Gender Equality Through Digital Entrepreneurship: Botswana’s Burgeoning Female Entrepreneurs

<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="800" height="533" src="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/800px-Africa_Food_Security_14_10665092094.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-412565" srcset="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/800px-Africa_Food_Security_14_10665092094.jpg 800w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/800px-Africa_Food_Security_14_10665092094-300x200.jpg 300w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/800px-Africa_Food_Security_14_10665092094-135x90.jpg 135w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/800px-Africa_Food_Security_14_10665092094-768x512.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /><figcaption>Africa Food Security Photo: via Wikimedia Commons</figcaption></figure>



Despite many attempts on the part of African governments, international donors and local players over the last few decades, there has been no definitive answer to the African agricultural challenge. With an&nbsp;<a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/03/26/africas-population-will-double-by-2050" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">expected</a>&nbsp;population of 2.5 billion in 2050, Africa is facing a task on an unprecedented scale in human history: feeding a population that will have doubled in 50 years.



By every estimate, the continent has enough&nbsp;<a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/04/28/africa-has-plenty-of-land-why-is-it-so-hard-to-make-a-living-from-it" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">resources</a>&nbsp;to achieve this. Firstly, the unused arable land in Africa is estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization to be in excess of 100 million hectares. Secondly, many of the countries on the continent still have a dominant rural population. Despite possessing both these assets, a series of unique challenges are holding the sector from truly taking off: major productivity gains are still to be made, land ownership policies and logistics issues hamper the development of commercial farms, agricultural subsidies in developed countries limit the global competitiveness of African agriculture…



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-looking-beyond-cereals">Looking beyond cereals</h2>



Focusing on supplying the internal demand on the continent is key to boost the development of a modern agriculture in Africa. For decades, the focus has been on cereals, which are easier to harvest, move and store. But, while cereal yields&nbsp;<a href="http://www.fao.org/3/i6583e/i6583e.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">increased</a>&nbsp;sixfold in East Asia between 1961 and 2013, they only increased by 1.6 times in sub-Saharan Africa. Projections clearly&nbsp;<a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0066428" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">show</a>&nbsp;that the current yield increase trend is insufficient to close the gap on population growth.&nbsp;



As the continent begins looking&nbsp;<a href="https://www.solidaridadnetwork.org/news/preparing-africas-agriculture-for-the-future/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">beyond</a>&nbsp;cereals for its needs, one agricultural sector which remains underexplored, the growing of fruit and vegetables, begins to appear more attractive. Prized for both nutritional qualities and yield rate, fruit and vegetables could be exactly what Africa needs to avoid a food crisis.



César Tella Faha, a farmer from Bafoussam, in western Cameroon, turned to vegetable production after starting as a hairdresser and then a small wholesaler. Through the use of innovative production techniques and irrigation systems, he grows tomatoes, with a yield of around 40 tonnes per hectare each season. The income allowed him to expand constantly to the point where he now owns two crop-years of six hectares of tomatoes and two more of four hectares, reaching a harvest of more than 800 tonnes. With a turnover in excess of €300,000 and dozens of workers under his employment, he has become the model of the successful agri-entrepreneur.



César&#8217;s case is not exceptional. Plenty of other farmers in Bafoussam have used similar techniques to eschew the stereotypical image attached to the African subsistence farmer. Unfortunately, however, this cliché is not entirely false, with many other farmers remaining below the poverty line.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Division of labour in the agriculture value chain</h2>



Conventional wisdom holds that entrepreneurs must control the entire value chain and sell their products directly to the final consumer. But such an approach, while appreciated by those who seek ”authentic” products, is rarely beneficial to the farmer. Farming is a high-maintenance job in which even the smallest lapse in&nbsp;<a href="https://www.agrivi.com/blog/ensure-stable-yields-with-regular-crop-maintenance/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">tending</a>&nbsp;the fields can result in a compromised crop. Moreover, farmers are dependent on certain times of the year for harvesting different crops, which will not necessarily be in tune with the market.



Conversely, traders specialize not in cultivating fields, but in transporting and selling the products to the consumer. Often enough, between the farmer and the marketplace trader, the goods traverse an entire range of wholesalers and semi-wholesalers who act as logisticians and distributors. Sourcing their merchandise from several farmers allows them to offer a variety of products to their customers. Consequently, the producer-vendor&nbsp;<a href="https://www.bain.com/insights/what-is-a-farmer-allied-intermediary/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">pairing</a>, if carefully implemented, makes it possible to meet the needs of the market by multiplying outlets and fluidly selling agricultural production, while limiting losses for the farmers.



Despite this, agricultural middlemen are regularly held in disdain by customers who accuse them of being the cause of the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/08/04/expert-middlemen-fleecing-peasant-farmers-creating-artificial-scarcity/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">abysmal</a>&nbsp;gap between the &#8220;field&#8221; price and the price paid by the end customer. While this is undoubtedly true sometimes, agricultural intermediaries are an indispensable part of the supply mechanisms.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Supply chains in Africa</h2>



This is all the truer in Africa, where distribution is&nbsp;<a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20200408-african-street-vendors-feel-the-squeeze-under-strict-covid-19-measures-food-traders-markets-coronavirus-lockdown" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">fragmented</a>&nbsp;into very small sales outlets, with street vendors dominating the rural areas and small kiosks more prevalent in towns and cities. These outlets are&nbsp;<a href="http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nutrition/docs/policies_programmes/CAADP/east_central_africa/presentations/3._Street_food_Vending_West_Africa_FAO.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">generally</a>&nbsp;run by women, who do not have the financial and operational means to buy directly from the farmers. A wholesaler is much better equipped to buy large volumes and deal with the costly transport of goods from the place where they are produced to the urban and rural settlements where they are consumed.



This organization leads to&nbsp;<a href="https://www.cordaid.org/en/news/we-cut-out-the-middlemen-breaking-down-the-barriers-of-african-smallholder-farmers/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">intermediaries</a>&nbsp;sometimes taking advantage of farmers by imposing prices or purchase conditions that do not let them improve their living conditions. For agriculture to flourish in Africa, a shift away from predatory&nbsp;<a href="https://www.devex.com/news/why-african-agriculture-still-depends-on-the-middle-man-or-woman-88799" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">middlemen</a>&nbsp;is needed: professional suppliers who understand that their interest is not to crush the farmers, but to work with them in the long term need to take their place.



Such a shift would be advantageous to both farmers, who will get fairer prices for their labour, and the traders, who will have access to higher quality products at constant prices. Such&nbsp;<a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/africas-food-system-needs-a-better-class-of-middlemen/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">responsible</a>&nbsp;intermediaries already exist, such as&nbsp;La Clé des Champs&nbsp;in Gabon,&nbsp;ASL&nbsp;in Cameroon, and&nbsp;Pure Grow Africa&nbsp;in Uganda and Kenya. Dozens of other, smaller such businesses dot the continent.



These fruit and vegetable SMEs are essential to the sector because they allow it to be regulated, modernized and, above all, to improve the quality and price of the end product.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Obstacles remain, even locally</h2>



Despite being rarely mentioned, one of the largest obstacles to the development of these new, formal businesses is the crippling taxation system. They are subject to the same rules of VAT, corporate tax, and other taxes as conventional businesses, while having to operate in a sector dominated by an informal economy.



Most of their&nbsp;<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27644432" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">competitors</a>&nbsp;do not pay any taxes, which allows them to sell at aggressive prices and maintain an iron grip on much of the supply chain. New entrants, therefore, have no interest in going formal. This issue is to be addressed if the agricultural sector is to truly prosper.



For example, ASL works with small producers throughout Cameroon. The company pre-finances their campaigns, provides them with technical support to improve their production, and buys their products to market them. On the local market, these products are subject to various taxes, including a VAT of 19.25%, which automatically leads to increased prices.



These informal competitors are simple traders who buy and sell at the best prices, do not support the farmers over the long term, and do not seek continuous improvement in quality, with price as their only objective. The 20% mark-up incurred by the formal traders makes it very difficult for them to compete. The whole value chain suffers: upstream, the farmers who are not supported, and downstream, the consumers who are forced to buy lower quality products.



The fruit and vegetable sector is an exceptional opportunity for Africa to meet its gigantic food needs. African farmers have everything to gain if the sector is better organized. Virtuous intermediaries will&nbsp;<a href="https://www.empowerafrica.com/the-future-of-food-production-in-africa/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">professionalize</a>&nbsp;the sector, providing important season pre-financing for farmers, quality logistics which reduce losses, stable outlets that enable farmers to plan for the long term, and a reduction in imports by offering cheaper local products.



Such a <a href="https://www.solidaridadnetwork.org/news/preparing-africas-agriculture-for-the-future/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">future</a> for African agriculture is within grasp, but unfair competition and indiscriminate taxation seriously hamper the pace of modernization. 



Bobby Juuko, founder of Pure Grow Africa, and François-Xavier d&#8217;Ornellas, the CEO and founder of French impact specialist classM.

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Agricultural Entrepreneurship Is Key to Unleashing the Full Potential of Africa’s Rural Areas

<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="820" height="547" src="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-890982518-820x547.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-412371" srcset="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-890982518-820x547.jpg 820w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-890982518-300x200.jpg 300w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-890982518-135x90.jpg 135w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-890982518-768x512.jpg 768w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-890982518-1536x1024.jpg 1536w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GettyImages-890982518-scaled.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 820px) 100vw, 820px" /><figcaption>Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya&#8217;s president, speaks during the independence celebrations on Jamhuri Day at Kasarani stadium in Nairobi, Kenya, on Tuesday, Dec. 12, 2017. Kenyas main opposition alliance postponed indefinitely plans to swear-in its leader as president of a so-called Peoples Assembly, after the government warned such a step would amount to treason. Photographer: Luis Tato/Bloomberg via Getty Images</figcaption></figure>



Food from the ocean, or blue foods, are essential for the future food and nutritional security of the Kenyan people. Sustainably increasing consumption and production of blue foods is a critical component of our country’s development&nbsp;<a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">strategy</a>.



Blue foods also contribute to the Strategic Food Reserve programme in Kenya. Through this programme we seek to scale up the capacity and capability of our small-scale fishers to produce sustainably, add value to, and market fish and fisheries products for food, income and jobs.



These efforts demonstrate an important solution to two of the world’s greatest challenges: feeding the world’s growing population and eliminating poverty. Globally, blue foods could play a much larger role in improving nutrition and food security, and creating economic opportunities — but only if we transform our relationship with the ocean and the small-scale fishers whose livelihoods depend on it.



With smart policies and investments, fish, crustaceans, seaweeds, and other blue foods can act as superfoods that help solve many of the global food system’s challenges. Already, they provide a vital source of protein and nutrition for more than&nbsp;<a href="https://www.un.org/en/conf/ocean/background.shtml" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">three billion</a>&nbsp;people worldwide. For many countries in the Southern Hemisphere, they provide&nbsp;<a href="https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/contribution_of_fisheries_to_food_and_nutrition_security_0.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">50 percent</a>&nbsp;of people’s average animal protein.&nbsp;



Blue food solutions are needed now more than ever. COVID-19 has fueled a steep rise in hunger and poverty, which climate change is likely to worsen. Last year, around&nbsp;<a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/12-07-2021-un-report-pandemic-year-marked-by-spike-in-world-hunger" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">811 million people</a>, a tenth of the world’s population, were undernourished; meanwhile, the pandemic pushed&nbsp;<a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19-global-poverty-turning-corner-pandemic-2021" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">97 million more people</a>into extreme poverty. As we build back better from the COVID-19 pandemic, we should prioritize solutions that create a more equitable and sustainable food system.



For blue foods, our&nbsp;focus should be on where most fishers find their livelihoods: small-scale fisheries, which employ&nbsp;<a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/515701468152718292/pdf/664690ESW0P1210120HiddenHarvest0web.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">90 percent</a>&nbsp;of the over 120 million fish workers worldwide. Almost all these workers, over&nbsp;<a href="http://www.fao.org/voluntary-guidelines-small-scale-fisheries/ihh/en/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">90 percent</a>,&nbsp;live in developing countries and most&nbsp;of their catch is for human consumption, pointing to their central role in food security and sustaining local economies.



Yet, small-scale fishers face numerous challenges. Overfishing is common throughout the world, often fueled by harmful subsidies and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, which deplete fish stocks. Inadequate scientific and technological capacity to improve sustainable production,&nbsp;inefficient&nbsp;distribution systems, and competition with larger industrial fleets also make it harder for small-scale fishers to generate sustainable incomes.



We need to fundamentally change our approach. With smarter management practices and technological innovation, research shows the ocean can sustainably produce much more food than it does today —&nbsp;up to&nbsp;<a href="https://oceanpanel.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/The%20Future%20of%20Food%20from%20the%20Sea.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">two-thirds</a>&nbsp;of the animal protein needed to feed the world’s population&nbsp;by 2050.



But simply producing more food is not enough. We must also ensure blue foods and the related economic benefits are equitably&nbsp;distributed. Local fishers in poorer nations do not have the means to compete with the&nbsp;<a href="https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaau2161" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">larger industrial fishing fleets of wealthier countries</a>.&nbsp;As fish become scarcer, the scales tip in favour of these industrialized operations who can fish for longer, farther and deeper — placing&nbsp;many African nations at a disadvantage. Only by putting small-scale actors at the heart of blue food policies can countries tackle these inequalities.



Some countries are taking action to address these challenges. In 2018, I joined 13 fellow heads of state under the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, to start addressing these global issues. We each committed to produce, protect and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.oceanpanel.org/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">sustainably manage 100 percent</a>&nbsp;of our national waters; and work towards ensuring wild fish stocks are restored and harvested at sustainable levels and that aquaculture is sustainably grown to meet global needs.



In Kenya, we&nbsp;recognize that small-scale fishers must be at the heart of any sustainable ocean plan. We should empower them to be stewards of our marine ecosystems.&nbsp;



Kenya has taken several measures to support small scale fishers.&nbsp; We have established&nbsp;<a href="https://www.iajournals.org/articles/iajsse_v2_i2_137_165.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Beach Management Units</a>&nbsp;(BMUs), community-led organizations that bring together fishers, traders, boat owners and other local stakeholders, to better manage the ocean they all depend on. These units have been instrumental in safeguarding fisheries’ resources, sustainably managing our coastal areas and have provided many blue food initiatives with investment opportunities. And crucially, the benefits — more jobs, more food, more economic opportunities — go directly to local communities.



Kenya has seen first-hand the immense benefits for people, nature, and the economy that investing in small-scale fishers and local blue food programmes can bring. A healthy ocean and blue foods are indispensable to building a stronger, more sustainable, and equitable food system.



We look forward to working with more countries in championing blue foods as a vital way to feed more people equitably, sustain more livelihoods and preserve ocean health for future generations.



Uhuru Kenyatta is President of Kenya and a member of the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta Attends Jamhuri Day Celebrations

President Uhuru Kenyatta says Small-Scale Fishers are Key to Fighting Global Hunger and Poverty

<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="820" height="546" src="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20351421759_9900ccaad9_k-820x546.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-412243" srcset="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20351421759_9900ccaad9_k-820x546.jpg 820w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20351421759_9900ccaad9_k-300x200.jpg 300w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20351421759_9900ccaad9_k-135x90.jpg 135w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20351421759_9900ccaad9_k-768x511.jpg 768w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20351421759_9900ccaad9_k-1536x1022.jpg 1536w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20351421759_9900ccaad9_k.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 820px) 100vw, 820px" /><figcaption>Farm, Vioolsdrift, Northern Cape, South Africa Photo: via Flickr</figcaption></figure>



By Samira Amellal, CEO at CropLife Africa Middle East



For too long, Africa’s farmers have been pitted against its environmentalists. The common narrative seems to suggest that trade-offs are inevitable between feeding the continent’s growing population and protecting its land, water and biodiversity while taking climate action.



But it need not always be a zero sum game like this. Breakthrough innovations are redefining how these two sectors can work together, and researchers from both the private and public sectors have embraced this challenge by developing&nbsp;new products and practices that can address both needs jointly.



Crop breeding programmes, for instance, are not only focused on boosting yields, but also on helping&nbsp;farmers put measures in place to improve soil health and capture carbon in the soil.



Soils are amongst the biggest potential carbon sinks, and the practice also helps reduce erosion, retain moisture and diversify soils’ microorganisms.



New crop varieties are also being designed to use less water and to be more tolerant of droughts, heatwaves, and salinity from ocean flooding. Yet others are being bred to be resistant&nbsp;to common diseases, such as bananas resistant to “fusarium wilt” that is sweeping across countries like Uganda where bananas and plantains are staples in the diet.



Similarly, a range of different crop protection products, both biological and chemical, are helping farmers not only protect their harvests but also to preserve forests and other natural habitats. This is because&nbsp;<a href="https://www.cabi.org/projects/global-burden-of-crop-loss/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">up to 40 per cent</a>&nbsp;of the world’s crops are lost to insects, diseases, and weeds, and farmers tend to clear more land for cultivation if yields on existing land are insufficient.



These practices are also helping African farmers anticipate new and more frequent pest outbreaks due to climate change. A recent case in point was an outbreak of the&nbsp;Tuta absoluta&nbsp;moth in tomatoes in 2014, which led to a decline in tomato production and increased tomato prices across the region. Many of the lessons learnt from that experience were then replicated when the Fall Army Worm began decimating the region’s major grain and vegetable crops including&nbsp;maize, rice, sorghum one year later.&nbsp;It was used again during a major locust invasion the year after, when the outbreak threatened the food security and livelihoods of the over 300 million people living there.



Using these crop protection products as minimally as possible reduces the risk of impact to biodiversity and native species while disposing of their containers properly afterwards avoids the risk of polluting waterways.



At the same time, advances in digital agriculture are allowing farmers to anticipate risks from weather earlier and more effectively and also to track what is happening on their farms in real-time and adjust their methods and their inputs accordingly.



These innovations cannot come quickly enough for African farmers, who are facing extreme pressures at a scale unmatched by most other regions.&nbsp;Much of the continent faces the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.maplecroft.com/insights/analysis/global-economic-output-forecast-faces-high-or-extreme-climate-change-risks-by-2025/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">highest risk of exposure</a>&nbsp;to climate change, despite contributing only&nbsp;<a href="https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">around three per cent</a>&nbsp;of total historic greenhouse gas emissions globally.



At the same time, the average African farm performs at only around 40 per cent of its potential, and the continent contains more than 50 per cent of the world’s food insecure population and is the world’s fastest growing continent.



Ensuring farmers have access to the innovations they need is not simply a matter of ensuring they exist.&nbsp; Farmers may sometimes need incentives and training to adopt these practices. They also need a supporting environment outside the farm itself, including viable infrastructure, harmonised risk-based standards, and fair trading markets and protocols. For example,&nbsp;transport costs in Africa today are on average 63 per cent higher than in developed countries.



The continent’s current agricultural subsidy programmes could be redirected to support more of these innovations that deliver a “double win” for both food and the environment. Even more, once these gains started materializing, the $35 billion currently spent on food imports could instead be used to further fuel the economic growth of Africa’s rural areas.



As the global community comes together for the United Nations Food Systems Summit, Africa can proudly take its place at the global table with a broad set of concrete solutions to offer. Agricultural innovations across the continent are showing that Africa’s farmers are a solution not only to hunger but to the environment upon which our agriculture depends.

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Only Innovation Can Help Africa Align its Food, Climate and Environment Needs

<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-corporate-identity-crisis">Corporate Identity Crisis</h2>



It is no secret that humans anthropomorphise everything; perhaps it is down to the urge to make things more relatable or our need to recreate. Whatever the case, many inanimate, abstract concepts now bear personalities. Because of this, we can think of organisations with personas, and we argue that they should be responsible corporate citizens. In recent times, there has been a tension between the different personalities we have imbued our corporations with, which has resulted in an identity crisis if you will.



Is the corporate goal of an organisation solely to return a profit to its shareholders, or should it be purpose-driven and respond to wider societal needs at the expense of robust profits? As the world confronts the fragility of the current consumption-based economic system with the attendant environmental effects and perpetuating inequality, it has turned more and more to sustainability and societal impact as a possible alternative. The conversation on sustainability, however, has not sufficiently addressed the dichotomy presented by attempting to create impact economies with corporations not designed to deliver impact.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What is in a Name?</h2>



Corporations are largely delineated into two broad categories: those driven by profit and those driven by social impact. Those driven by profit are usually pragmatic and efficient, with little concern for other indices beyond the bottom line. Companies motivated by social impact defy maximising profit and aim to improve the quality of life. What is becoming evident however, is that the delineation cannot be absolute.



Private corporations can no longer pursue profit while ignoring the social, political and environmental effects their business has. Neither can Impact or development institutions claim to be adherent to social goals but promote inefficiency in delivering their services. Best practice seems to be shifting to the middle-ground, a hybrid between the need to run profitable enterprises which have a broader impact on the communities they serve.



Thought leaders like Dirk Schoenmaker, the Rotterdam Professor of Banking and Finance, have called for an impact economy that recognises these often-divergent urges and coalesces them to improve corporate citizenship and improve the quality



of life of customers, end-users, consumers and ultimately the country. Achieving this Impact Economy is often easier said than done, as corporate citizenship is often reflective of the economy and regulations of a country.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Redefining the Structural Space</h2>



Most companies conduct their business either in a market economy where the government provides public goods, such as health, education and security and regulates economic activities. However, private companies are geared towards profit-maximisation and usually at the expense of a more profound impact. Or companies operate in a state economy where the government controls the production of private and public goods ostensibly to ensure broader service provision but usually at the expense of efficiency and individual enterprise.



In Africa, where the distinction between the private and public sectors is becoming less obvious and more transparent and where private corporations that thrive do so with considerable government incentivisation, it is often difficult to tell the difference between the two systems. What is clear is that either system or a combination of both have contributed to environmental degradation, economic inequality, and reduction in the quality of life in Africa.



A possible solution to this will be redefining the economic structure and, by extension, the companies they foster; Schoenmaker refers to this as the Impact Economy. The Impact Economy coalesces the distinct features of the market economy and those of the state economy which seeks broader participation of both the public sector and the private sector in the provision of goods and services. This model actively encourages considering the common good and general welfare without sacrificing the self-sufficiency and growth of private enterprises.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Striking the Right Balance</h2>



Admittedly, the impact model appears self-indulgent and wistful, but it is not without precedent. Indeed, development financial institutions (DFIs) and development agencies are founded principally on the ideals of impact investing and sustainability, all while funding their operations. It is little wonder that most of these institutions are openly financing the achievements of the relevant United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in their industries and have done so while promoting profitability. Recently JP Morgan committed itself to invest in the SDGs and launched a DFI in 2020 that has so far channelled $146bn to development projects worldwide.



This is not to suggest that striking a balance between a shrewd investment philosophy, greater risk appetite and a mandate for development and profit is easy- just that it is possible and already exists in some ways.



To be fair, it may be asking African governments to take on more than they are able for now, but this is one of the specific roles DFIs can play. DFIs demonstrate the delicate balance needed for impact investment and advance the conversation on repurposing African organisations for impact and sustainable development. DFIs can also revisit what states should consider a public good; for instance, decent and affordable housing should be regarded as a public good in the same way education and health services are. Making these distinctions will broaden the space for impact investment as well.



The SDGs, if achieved by 2030, will serve all of humanity but perhaps Africa more than most. As countries task themselves with closing the SDG funding gap which stands at $2.5trn according to a UNCTAD report, they should also be concerned with reshaping organisations to help deliver them.



Babatunde Oyateru is a Communication and Development Professional who heads Communication and External Affairs for Shelter-Afrique, a Pan-African DFI. He is also a Doctoral Candidate in International Relations

Africa Should Rethink Business Models for Impact and Sustainability

*This analysis was produced by the team at Signal Risk



The apparent success of the multinational intervention in Cabo Delgado province has begun to shift the discourse on Mozambique’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector and its wider economic prospects. After a period of deep pessimism and uncertainty in the aftermath of the March attack on Palma, key actors have exuded greater optimism of late.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-an-imminent-comeback">An imminent comeback</h2>



First to express confidence in the future of Mozambique&#8217;s LNG sector was Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Max Tonela. Speaking during a meeting of the Confederation of Economic Associations (CTA) – the country’s largest business association – on 11 August, Tonela assured local stakeholders that LNG investors will soon return to Cabo Delgado following the recent gains made by the Mozambican Armed Defence Forces and police (FDS) and their Rwandan counterparts. His confidence was no doubt boosted by the 05 August liberation of the strategic town of Mocimboa da Praia from insurgent control.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Totally energised</h2>



Tonela’s position was echoed on 27 August by the African Development Bank (AfDB), which has lent more than USD 400 million to TotalEnergies for the multinational company&#8217;s Mozambique LNG project. In a statement to the Reuters news agency, AfDB president Akinwumi Adesina noted that the ongoing stabilisation of Cabo Delgado province should support the resumption of activities at the Mozambique LNG project within one year to 18 months.



The project was arguably the most affected by activities of the al-Sunnah Islamist militant group, given the fact that its contractors or those of its partners made up the bulk of the non-native community in Palma. Its facility in the Afungi peninsula – which has been under the oversight of local security personnel since April – has also served as a sanctuary for those fleeing violence in Palma. Unsurprisingly, territories in the vicinity of the concession were frequently targeted by militants. Nevertheless, since the deployment of Rwandan forces in mid-July, militants have been cleared from surrounding areas. The joint forces have also commenced with the establishment of a 25-kilometre security cordon around the concession, which is a key demand for the company to resume operations.



TotalEnergies itself has yet to publicly comment on the latest developments; however, its commitment to resuming its venture in Mozambique was demonstrated by recent personnel changes within the company. As per reports from 30 August, Maxime Rabilloud was appointed as country director for Mozambique, replacing Ronan Bescond. Rabilloud has vast experience in developing hydrocarbon projects in challenging jurisdictions and engaging with Lusophone stakeholders, having previously spearheaded TotalEnergies’ office in Brazil.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The peripheral push</h2>



While much of the talk on Mozambique’s LNG sector has surrounded TotalEnergies, another investor – the Italian-owned Eni – has continued to make steady progress on its venture.



On 17 June, a spokesperson for Eni noted that the company is on track to begin commercial exports of LNG from its Coral South Floating LNG facility (FLNG) in 2022. Located some 100 kilometres off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, Eni’s facility has been largely unaffected by the violence on land, thus allowing the company to maintain its schedule. The project, which cost roughly USD 7 billion, is expected to produce 3.4 million metric tonnes per annum (mmtpa) at scale, considerably less than TotalEnergies’ capacity of 13.1 mmtpa, and ExxonMobil’s capacity of 15.2 mmtpa. As part of an agreement, all gas extracted by Eni at Coral South will be sold to BP for a period of 20 years.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Assessment</h2>



The optimism demonstrated by key stakeholders in Mozambique’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector is largely rhetorical and does not necessarily shift timelines associated with progress in the sector and associated economic gains. As previously indicated, despite the declaration of force majeure, there was little to suggest that TotalEnergies would abandon its venture in Mozambique, especially after a substantial layoff and the conclusion of myriad funding and sales agreements. The same applies to ExxonMobil. While the United States (US) energy major is less exposed to insecurity in Cabo Delgado province (due to less spending thus far) there was insufficient evidence to suggest that it would completely divest from Mozambique and forgo a lucrative opportunity in the frontier market. Accordingly, it was noted that security concerns would delay construction activity by TotalEnergies – and ExxonMobil’s final investment decision – by at least a year as the companies assess the trajectory of the counter-insurgency efforts. Currently, as there are clear indications of a decline in the threat facing key LNG interests, both companies will likely proceed with their respective ventures.



The delay in construction activity by TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil will result in slower-than-expected economic growth and consolidation of key accounts in 2021. As per the latest April publication by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the domestic economy is projected to grow by 1.6 percent in 2021, recovering from a 1.3 percent GDP contraction in 2020. This is in contrast to forecasts prior to the security-related disruptions, which stated that the Mozambican economy would grow upwards of 2.5 percent in 2021. The current expected growth will have a soft consolidatory effect, with the deficit-to-GDP ratio expected to only decline from 5.4 percent in 2020 to 4.1 percent in 2021. The debt-to-GDP ratio on the other hand, will increase from 122.2 percent in 2020 to 125.3 percent in 2021, due to the uptake of emergency loans. Mozambique’s current account balance will also remain fragile at a deficit of 68.9 percent of GDP in 2021, while the country is expected to have a modest stock of reserves for the year in 2021, at an average of 2.8 months of import cover. That said, the commencement of exports by Eni – and the potential resumption of construction activities by TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil, alongside a recovery from the coronavirus-induced slowdown – could result in growth of more than 4 percent in 2022.



Should TotalEnergies commence with construction activities in 2022 or early 2023, this will – all things being equal – defer Mozambique’s expected LNG boom to the latter half of the current decade. Remarks by TotalEnergies suggest that it requires roughly three years to finalise construction activity and make the first commercial exports. This means that if the undertaking does commence as planned, it may only conclude in 2025 or 2026. Should ExxonMobil make its investment decision in 2022 and commence construction activity, there is also some consensus that it may only make first exports after 2026. Barring unforeseen events like natural disasters, further delays to the LNG timeline are seen as increasingly unlikely, especially given the commencement of processes to establish security buffers. Fuel companies typically have a relatively higher risk appetite than other commercial enterprises and have adapted to jurisdictions that are as insecure as Mozambique, such as Libya and Nigeria. Accordingly, once the companies’ minimum security conditions are met in Cabo Delgado province, they will likely commence with operations.



Mounting financial pressure on Mozambique may however, pressure the government to restructure its sole Eurobond and bilateral debt via the G20’s common framework. The USD 900 million bond matures in 2031 and has a coupon rate of 5 percent until 2024, which will increase to 9 percent thereafter. In the absence of the LNG windfall, Mozambique’s financing options will be limited, especially given a low-growth environment due to the coronavirus pandemic. As such, seeking debt treatment could be prudent on the part of Mozambican authorities. The plausibility of restructuring was noted by Fitch Ratings in its latest assessment on 21 July. The agency maintained its CCC (sub-investment) rating of Mozambique on account of existing risks to debt sustainability, elevated financing needs, unresolved public sector liabilities, and possible recourse via the G20.

Signal Risk on Mozambique – Going somewhere slowly

Rodrigo Aguilar is an International Political Economy expert, Author and Founder of The North American Project



The Black Death pandemic that affected Europe between 1348 and 1350, not only caused devastation, but it also served as the trigger for the Renaissance of the 14th&nbsp;Century. Few realize that, besides deriving in a cultural movement, the dire circumstances existing during this period led to the definition of the foundations of modern financing and diplomacy. This could serve as a reference as we face the ripple effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, which could represent the opportunity for the rebirth of today’s financing and multilateralism.



In addition to causing severe disruptions to the health and economy of millions of people, the Covid-19 pandemic initially deepened the mistrust in the capacity of multilateral organisms to collectively solve this crisis, and the future ones to come. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were affected as nations shaved their GDPs and unemployment significantly increased. However, as Rania Al-Mashat, Egypt’s Minister for International Cooperation, declared&nbsp;“as 2020 progressed, the world realized that it is only through collective action that we will be able to transit the road to reconstruction”. As a matter of fact, the only collective functional actions convened between nations so far in the pandemic have regarded financing, essentially because this crisis was “too big to fail”. As a result, until now, the world’s economies have been impacted but not entirely derailed.



One of the main challenges that remains is to find a way to direct the efforts from the private sector to avoid the deepening of polarization and inequities in the long run. According to Jay Collins, Citibank vice-chairman, close to 2% of financing for development has been sourced by the private sector.



In order to achieve the rebirth of multilateralism in general, and particularly regarding the financing of projects that contribute towards the achievement of the SDGs, it is necessary to focus the discussion on success stories where the mechanisms that facilitate collective action between private financing and development have been created. One of these examples is that of Arab investments in Egypt, which have significantly increased in a diversified way during the last years, contributing towards the agenda of regional and global development. Such cases have shown that a key factor in the equation to impulse and facilitate actions from the private sector is the existence of conditions of stability. This has not been the case in other African nations.



It is in this context that Egypt proposed an international discussion centered in the African continent during last week’s Forum for International Cooperation in Cairo, where multilateral organisms such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the African Development Bank participated.



The financial gap to achieve the SDGs amounts to 2.5 trillion USD. When considering the Official Development Assistance (ODA) data, which is about $150 billion USD a year, there is no way to fill the trillion-dollar gap unless mechanisms that involve the private sector are introduced. On the other hand, the private sector has been clear and pragmatic stating that there need to exist stable low-risk scenarios in order to invest. As a result, one of the neuralgic subjects of the forum was “blended financing”, which is the strategic use of financing for the development of the mobilization of resources from the private sector.



However, not everything in the conference revolved around sophisticated financial terminology because, at the end of the day, people’s lives and wellbeing are currently at stake. When Netumbo Nandi – Ndaitwah, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia, was asked why she should trust the multilateral framework, after declaring that less than 10% of her country is vaccinated, she did not hesitate to answer: “We must trust multilateralism because it is already there, we’ve become a global village to the point that there is no country in the world that can do it alone. When our countries were forced to shut down, multilateralism helped us to survive by at least keeping the trade flow of goods and services working”. Countries like Namibia are running out of time to mistrust multilateralism.



For this reason, the forum dedicated an entire day to workshops that involved the ample representation of African nation’s governments and focused on capacity building, cooperation sur-sur, sharing experiences, women in business and youth entrepreneurship in Africa, food safety, triangular cooperation, the African Free Trade Agreement and the development of human capital.



The step taken in Cairo last week was the first of many towards the rebirth of multilateralism having involved highly relevant stakeholders in the discussion of modern mechanisms for international cooperation in this region that, for many, remains forgotten. Threats like this pandemic have triggered, at least in the African continent, the need to align priorities and agendas that are usually in competition amongst themselves. Only time will tell if the positive spirit of collective action that prevailed during this forum will translate into the modernization of the multilateral development system for this region.



Will this be the new renaissance?

The Rebirth of Multilateralism in Africa and the Private Sector

Information is power. And personal information, or more specifically, who controls it, is rapidly becoming one of the most crucial business and consumer challenges of a digital economy.



We are more connected than ever before, but identity theft, online fraud and cybersecurity breaches are increasingly commonplace. Global corporations are accused of misusing and even selling personal data. So, how do we merge the divergent and competing strands into a secure, convenient offering that empowers our customers to be in control of their identity too?



We believe the answer lies in digital identity. More specifically, self-sovereign digital identity (SSDI).



SSDI provides a quick and highly secure way for people to store and update their own identity data on a personal mobile device, and share proof of it through a secure digital verification system, without having to share actual copies of their documents.



What makes it different to other forms of digital identity management – and a game changer for financial inclusion in Africa – is that SSDI not only gives consumers a way to control their personal information with less risk of identity theft, but it also gives individuals who don’t have physical documents a means to build up legal proof of identity, enabling them to access benefits and financial services that they might not be able to obtain otherwise.



An SSDI system uses secure electronic “credentials” that are issued by relevant authorities (such as Home Affairs, credit bureaus, financial services organisation and similar) and which a person stores in a mobile app to share at their discretion. It transforms the arduous document-based process typically required each time you need to prove an aspect of your identity (identity number, legal and regulatory compliance like FICA, proof of residence and more) into an electronic mobile request/response that takes seconds.



Once adopted on a large scale, SSDI lowers transaction costs, protects customer information and limits the opportunity for cybercrime. What makes it so exciting for companies like Absa is that it lowers the cost of opening accounts, which has the potential to make small business financing more accessible, deepen savings and credit for under-banked customers, and in future even reduce the harm caused by fraud and identity theft.



So, what will it take for SSDI to take hold in Africa? Because of the volume of personal information that financial institutions require for everything, from FICA compliance to credit scores and lines of credit, they are best placed to build the platforms and environments that will make SSDI possible. The good news is that the local financial services industry has already made significant progress.



As a founding steward of the Global Sovrin Network since 2018, Absa has been actively involved in the global deployment of an open-source public-permissioned distributed ledger technology network – the world’s first to be built specifically for SSDI purpose – as well as the local development of a self-sovereign digital identity management system.



This builds on four years of Absa’s work with BankServ, other banks and multiple local and global forums, to set up an industry-wide governance framework for self-sovereign identity, including collaboration with the South African International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) to develop documentation that covers the standards for SSDI management. Collaborators are now exploring how to make the governance framework machine-readable, to enable implementation via automated electronic channels as part of the overall identity management system.



This progress is supported by close involvement with the World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) Identity Coalitions Network, a learning and action network of organisations that implement human-centric, collaborative digital identity solutions.



While the financial services industry has done well to lay these foundations for SSDI in Africa, the tipping point will only come when other industries start doing the same.



Much like cell phone technology and the internet, the true power of SSDI will only be unleashed when it is embedded across all sectors of society, from education and medical care to telecommunications and retail. And that will require all role players – government bodies, regulators, service providers, public and private agencies – to take up the SSDI baton and become part of the change.



By Suren Pillay, Interim Chief Technology Officer, and Sean Mouton, Head R&amp;D: Chief Technology Office at Absa Group Limited

Why self-sovereign digital identity is a game changer for financial inclusion in Africa

<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="820" height="546" src="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/South_Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot_Power_Station_cropped-820x546.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-411946" srcset="https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/South_Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot_Power_Station_cropped-820x546.jpg 820w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/South_Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot_Power_Station_cropped-300x200.jpg 300w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/South_Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot_Power_Station_cropped-135x90.jpg 135w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/South_Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot_Power_Station_cropped-768x511.jpg 768w, https://cms.cnbcafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/South_Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot_Power_Station_cropped.jpg 1025w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 820px) 100vw, 820px" /><figcaption>South Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot Power Station Photo: via Wikimedia Commons</figcaption></figure>



Africa, despite its low contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, remains the most vulnerable continent to climate change impacts. It also hosts some of the lowest-income countries in the world, limiting the resources available for adapting to a heating planet. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/19/poverty-and-fragility-where-will-the-poor-live-in-2030/">Seven out of the 10 most climate vulnerable nations in the world are located in Africa</a>. Moreover, given the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, the African region faces its first recession in 25 years, according to a <a href="https://www.uneca.org/stories/eca%27s-building-forward-for-an-african-green-recovery-outlines-bolder-intra-african-trade-and">UN report</a>, with output losses due to COVID-19 estimated to be USD $99 billion. This is compounded by climate impacts on economic output projected to cause annual losses of between 3-5% of GDP by 2030 under a business-as-usual scenario. In some cases, this will be as much as -15% of GDP.&nbsp;



Yet Africa’s potential to tackle climate change is immense and largely untapped. The continent boasts an almost unlimited potential of solar capacity, abundant hydro, wind, and geothermal energy sources. The International Renewable Energy Agency (<a href="https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2015/IRENA_Africa_2030_REmap_2015_low-res.pdf">IRENA</a>) estimates that renewable energy capacity in Africa could reach 310 GW by 2030; which would put the continent at the forefront of renewable energy generation globally.



The financial sector and the banking sector in particular, should play a key role in mobilizing resources to investment in climate change migration in order to reduce GHG emissions as well as in climate change adaptation through building resilience. Africa’s commitment under the Paris Agreement presents a <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/AFAC_Brochure_2018.pdf">USD $3 trillion investment opportunity by 2030 – 75%</a> of the investment is expected to come from the private sector to compliment the public sector financing. This calls for innovative approaches to attract and steer financial flows towards low carbon and climate resilient development solutions. Africa’s financial institutions are well placed as key stakeholders in the evolving global climate finance landscape, helping design solutions and mobilizing private capital for climate action. Climate finance is even more important in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.&nbsp;We are seeing a growing community of financial institutions taking action and demonstrating leadership on climate change and Africa must take a seat at the table. Increasingly, we are seeing that financial institutions can influence corporate behavior by offering loans and investments that factor in climate-related risks.



The impact of climate change poses a number of risks, however, there is a clear value proposition for the financial sector and how best to take advantage of these opportunities. The impact to the financial sector could range from increased premium costs for insurance companies to higher default risk with regard to banks non-performing loans. Despite these risks, climate change also poses opportunities that the financial sector can capitalize on. For instance, the market for impact investors is increasing but many banks still don’t understand how climate change could provide an opportunity and because of that they are not lending to impact investors who want to invest in that space. IRENA estimates that Africa requires an annual investment of USD $70 billion in renewable energy projects until 2030 for clean energy transformation to take place.&nbsp;



Over the past decade, several leading climate-change initiatives have been launched globally with the aim of involving financial sector actors to help leverage opportunities to drive climate action. More notably, the industry-led, UN-convened <a href="https://www.unepfi.org/net-zero-banking/">Net-Zero Banking Alliance</a> brings together 53 banks from 27 countries representing almost a quarter of global banking assets (over USD $37 trillion), which are committed to aligning their lending and investment portfolios with net-zero emissions by 2050. However, African members are significantly underrepresented in almost all of these global climate action initiatives. Climate change is expected to accelerate and is no longer considered only as an environmental threat because it affects all economic sectors. Furthermore, climate-related risks are causing added risks for the financial sector. To mitigate the negative impacts, financial institutions and regulators must start undertaking various climate finance initiatives to mitigate those barriers. For example, South Africa’s Standard Bank has started working with clients to support climate adaptation and resilience and is actively seeking opportunities to finance infrastructure that helps with flood control, water efficiency, water storage and energy efficiency. One example of this is a climate-smart agricultural project with female farmers in Malawi.&nbsp;



The region must also leverage innovative approaches to attract and steer financial flows towards low carbon and climate resilient development solutions through sustainability-linked loans (SLL) and green bonds with greater participation of financial institutions. First issued in 2017, a SLL is an increasingly important part of the solution, enabling the banking sector to use their financial resources to drive sustainability outcomes. A SLL is a loan whereby apart from the standard financial criteria, there are also sustainability-related targets. Most of these loans contain incentives, and the idea is that when the company actually achieves the sustainability targets that were agreed upon, the interest rates that the company need to pay will go down, however, in some cases there is also the possibility of a penalty, meaning that if the company does not achieve any of the targets, the interest rate may actually go up. With a growing number of governments and companies adopting environmental, social and governance (ESG) principles, the global banking sector has recently seen a significant number of SLLs, which presents an opportunity to increase steadily across Africa.



Furthermore, the continent must accelerate developments in its nascent green bonds market. A green bond is a debt security issued by an organization for the purpose of financing or refinancing projects that contribute positively to the environment and/or climate. Green bonds have grown exponentially over the years, surpassing more than <a href="https://www.smart-energy.com/industry-sectors/finance-investment/green-bonds-market-passes-1-trillion-milestone-amid-global-turmoil/">$1 trillion in issued bonds</a> since the mechanism emerged in 2007. &nbsp;Despite growing demand globally, Africa lags behind other emerging markets. To date, there have only been <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI_Policy_brief_3_FINAL_clean_xxP8GTN.pdf">16 bond issuances, representing only 1.5% of total global bonds by number and less than 0.3% by value</a>. Green bonds are a critical innovative financing mechanism that presents an opportunity to close Africa’s urgent infrastructure financing gap estimated between <a href="https://sponsorcontent.cnn.com/int/absa/net-zero-africa/">USD $68 billion &#8211; USD $108 billion a year</a> – made more pronounced since the onset of COVID-19. South Africa currently leads, having secured a significant amount of the continent’s green bonds, with Morocco and Nigeria trailing behind.



Several aspects, however, can complicate these efforts. Better access to information is a critical component in the promotion of climate finance and other innovative financing mechanisms. There is no agreed upon set of regulations like with other aspects of traditional financial services. Without a clear regulatory framework, African financial institutions are left to determine for themselves an appropriate set of guidelines. Furthermore, this is made complicated by data gaps in the ability to monitor and assess climate-related risks to financial stability. By having more representation in these global climate action initiatives, African members can have a more active role in conversations to develop a harmonized set of climate-related risks, with guidelines for tracking and monitoring investments.



The financial sector can have an important role to play in helping Africa build resilience against climate change through promoting climate action and environmental risks in their credit and investment process. There is a clear opportunity for the continent to have a permanent seat at the climate change negotiating table to take advantage of the renewed focus on climate action and to promote a climate resilient and low-carbon economy while harnessing innovative approaches to address Africa’s urgent infrastructure financing gap . There’s not only a business argument in that there is now a much better understanding of the financial risks of climate change, but more importantly, increasing climate change effects on health, food and water security among other factors, are threatening socio-economic development in Africa.



&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;



Iftin Fatah is a Director, Financial Institutions at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. The views expressed herein are her own.

South_Africa-Mpumalanga-Middelburg-Arnot_Power_Station_cropped

Africa’s Financial Sector Should Play a Key Role in Mobilizing Resources for Climate Action

As the continent suffers the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, AfCFTA must not be relegated to the background.&nbsp;



The recently concluded Annual Meetings of the African Development Bank remind us that the consequences of Covid-19 will weigh on the continent’s economic prospects for the foreseeable future, with between $145-$190 billion lost in terms of GDP, 30 million people falling into extreme poverty, and economic growth in 2021 less than half the world average. In a world faced with a crisis of such magnitude, the temptation to protectionism is gaining ground.



Africa must avoid this trap at all costs. Even more so as the African integration was given a huge boost just before the crisis, thanks to the adoption of the AfCFTA. This ambitious project must not be allowed to suffer. To the contrary, it should be used as the powerful tool it is, both to mitigate the consequences of the pandemic and to transition to a more unified Africa.&nbsp;



AFIS &#8211; the leading pan-African financial industry platform that brings together private operators and public institutions &#8211; calls for a critical acceleration of financial reforms as a priority step to achieve the overarching goals of the AfCFTA. We think that the African financial industry has a decisive part to play in supporting companies and individuals to trade and invest across the continent and ease cross-country payments and capital flows.&nbsp;



As announced by Wamkele Mene, the General Secretary of AfCFTA, the launch of the Pilot Phase for the Pan African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), developed by the African Union and Afreximbank, is a game-changer. Today, payments for intra-African trade are convoluted. They often require involving a non-African intermediary state even for trade between neighboring countries.&nbsp;



Such inefficiencies up fund transfer costs within the continent. Previous initiatives aimed at modernizing regional payment systems have failed to resolve this problem. Besides accelerating implementation of PAPSS, AFIS now calls for a single and unified norm of QR (“Quick Response”) that will allow full interoperability between banks and payment platforms across Africa, as well as permitting payments from banking and mobile money accounts.&nbsp;



To make AfCFTA a success, facilitation of capital flows and non-convertibility of African currencies must also be considered a top priority. In Africa, most cross-border transactions require the Euro or US Dollar, which makes economic and financial integration considerably difficult. Concrete and critical solutions exist.&nbsp;



It is possible to create a “unit of account”, a single measure which would provide an equivalent between African currencies without going through a non-African currency and thus reduce the non-convertibility of the currency risk. Alternatively, we can implement 2-3 regional currencies to simplify trading between currencies in Africa. We want to raise the issue of harmonization and capital flows’ liberalization between different exchange rate regimes to mitigate the exchange risk and make operations more affordable.&nbsp;



For the African financial industry to play its role in favor of African economic integration, AFIS also urges regulatory bodies and policy makers to accelerate collaboration and go further towards greater harmonization. Even if the process may be long, it is a vital step to take. Practical reforms could be: to create a platform for a supervisory college until regulators come together; to develop common rules for accounting in Africa (there are far too many different standards) and to establish minimum standards to share data across the borders to facilitate credit; to create a credit bureau at the Pan-African level; to develop a regional platform for capital markets.&nbsp;



It is also desirable to start to harmonize the minimum level of capital required for banks and insurance companies, considering the size of the economies, and to recognize agreements between countries for managers and skilled labor, which could ease skill transfers between African countries. To accelerate African integration, harmonizing consumer protection regimes, cyber security and handling disputes at a Pan-African level also need to be swiftly addressed.&nbsp;



At a time when the Covid-19 pandemic is severely impacting the development of the continent, and the rest of the world risks looking more and more inward, institutions, regulators and operators of the African financial industry cannot ignore their responsibilities towards Africa’s accelerated integration. We have to keep working together through public-private discussion platforms to seek solutions and stay on track to a more connected, resilient and confident Africa.&nbsp;



A quarter of the world&#8217;s population will live in Africa by 2050. Its emergence as an economic global powerhouse cannot be delayed. Financial integration is the cornerstone of the AfCFTA. Without it, it would probably be bound to fail.&nbsp;

Critical financial industry reforms are needed to accelerate African integration and make AfCFTA work

“I’m sorry. The system is offline”



It’s every South African’s pet peeve when engaging with a Government entity. What if I told you the system being offline is only the tip of the technology failure iceberg when it comes to South Africa’s public sector digital infrastructure?



The system is not only offline. It’s disparate. It’s disconnected. It’s clunky. It’s ageing. And it’s even non-existent in some cases. It’s all of these things and more because the truth is there isn’t just one system… there are many different systems servicing many different departments in a many different ways. Few, if any, of these systems talk to each other the way they should and the only people that truly lose out are us, the South African citizens.



With the recent unrest still painfully fresh in our minds, you have to wonder, what if our police force was properly digitised? What if all of our security forces were digitally interconnected?



Would the situation have escalated to the degree that it did?&nbsp;



Walk into your local police station right now and you probably won’t find a laptop behind the counter. What you will find is a police officer waiting with pen and form in hand. Almost every activity from a citizen’s point of view in a police station is painstakingly done with pen and paper. Does that fill you with sufficient confidence? At this point, it fills too many of us with indifference as this is sadly seen as the way of things. But it doesn’t have to be.



Our digital society dictates that we should be far beyond this, especially when the safety and security of South African citizens are at stake.



From the police force to home affairs to the department of water and sanitation, so many of our government departments are either stuck in a bygone era or operate in isolation with their own system in place. You would think that one government would have one integrated, interconnected system. Yet here we are – bandied from pillar to post or stand in excessively long queues just to get a license renewed, or an affidavit signed, or a business license applied for. Surely, with the right technology, these things could be reduced from hours to minutes, days and weeks to hours. There are live examples of where this has already been achieved.



We live in an era where almost every organisational process and movement can be optimised to the nth&nbsp;&nbsp;degree. Our police force could benefit from increased digitisation. Imagine applying for your ID or passport and it taking 2-3 days to be completed and returned to you. Imagine applying to have your company reistered and it being done in a few hours. There are examples where these improvements have been done.



For example, the South Africa Polics Service, with thousands of vehicles on patrol across the country, does not have a system in place that can monitor or control how, where, and when these vehicles are used, or for that matter, abused. With the right system in place, they could monitor petrol consumption, area travelled, service history, and much more. For instance, the head office in Gauteng should know if a patrol vehicle is filled up in Polokwane. They should know how much petrol is put in and how far the car travelled between top-ups. Multiply this by every vehicle in the department, let alone all of government – through an integrated, connected system, and I can guarantee you would have some interesting data to work with.&nbsp;



Everything that can be measured should be measured, so we can analyse, understand and optimise to create a more efficient government. It’s the least a citizen of this country deserves considering it is the citizens who are funding these operations.



There are, of course, areas of excellence to praise. The best example of this from a National Department perspectives is probably the South African Revenue Services (SARS), for instance, can compete with the very best as a world-class organisation. You may find eFiling a frustrating experience, but in truth, it should be praised for what it is – a system that does everything you want it to, from wherever you are in the world. It is absolutely world class!



You may have heard of businesses embarking on various transformation efforts to attain the elusive ‘single view of their customer’, but they are doing this for a very good reason – to gain maximum insights on their customer behaviours and actions to help provide those same customers with a product that offers maximum value.



When SARS needs to talk to Home Affairs or the Department of Social Services – we need a system that will allow any department to get a unified view of our citizens. That unified view can even be done from the time a pregnant mother walks into a State hospital when Social Services can be flagged as to what her current or future needs might be, where a child is injured and might need specialised treatment and it is flagged within the Healthcare system what those future needs will be. Imagine the time saving, the budget efficiencies, the ease of being in a system where the State is providing for the citizen’s needs.



To do this, our government needs to take all its disparate, disconnected, and dissimilar systems and bind them together. But that can be merely a dream to behold and an absolute nightmare to implement, without the right planning and partners. Unbundling all the megaprojects that our public sector has already invested tens of millions of Rands implementing is simply not possible, nor is it practical.



At Software AG, our unique technology can connect any system with every system no matter who put it in place. We are the only global technology company that has the proven technology implemented, proven to work in a public setting for some of the world’s largest developed nations.



This is not a pitch; this is a plea. So much can be done if all of our public silos knew what each other were doing. Not only will it make for a more efficient state, but with the right training regimen in place, it can also be serviced by an army of SMMEs, who can be empowered to provide the professional services needed to keep this system up and running.



An efficient system will create an effective government and an engaged citizen. This is one country, not 15 departments. Let us usher South Africa into a connected future we can all be proud of.&nbsp;

Dear Government – the system is not offline, it’s out of line

*This analysis was produced by the team at Signal Risk 



On 26 August, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) published details on a wave of deadly violence that occurred in the East Wollega zone of Oromia region on 18 and 19 August. According to the commission, more than 210 people were killed in a series of ethnic-based attacks in the Giga Kiremu area of East Wollega, which is home to ethnic Oromo and Amharan communities.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Ethnic animosity</h2>



The violence reportedly began when federal and Amhara forces withdrew from Gida Kiremu for unknown reasons. Shortly thereafter, militants affiliated with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – a splinter from the Oromo Liberation Front political party – targeted Amharan settlements in the area; 150 people were killed in the incursion. This triggered a series of reciprocal attacks between Amharan and Oromo civilians in the area on 19 August, which resulted in a further 60 fatalities.



It is unclear how the conflict cycle came to an end, and facts around the violence have been disputed by Amhara interest groups and the OLA.



The Amhara Association of America (AAA) – one of the largest Amhara diaspora collectives – corroborated the account by the EHRC, noting in a circular that “at least 135 Amhara were killed and hundreds of homes destroyed in the 18 August attack by suspected members of OLA militias&#8221;. In contrast, the OLA has accused both organisations of grossly distorting facts regarding the incident. As per the OLA, the fatalities in Gida Kiremu were a result of clashes between OLA fighters and Amhara militias, as opposed to incursions against civilians.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Convenient allies</h2>



The violence in East Wollega comes exactly a week after the OLA formally confirmed its partnership with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). As per an 11 August statement by OLA leader Kumsa Diriba (also known as Jaal Marroo), the allegiance was cemented “a few weeks ago” following a proposal by the TPLF.



In terms of the nature of the cooperation, Diriba noted that the two groups share battlefield information (and fight on different fronts) with the goal of overthrowing the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed militarily. More significantly, Diriba alluded to the possibility of new political alliances against the incumbent regime, echoing earlier remarks by TPLF spokesperson Getachew Reda. However, both figures withheld further information on the political and military arrangements of their accord.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Calling for backup</h2>



The federal government has not been idle in the face of this synergistic threat. Shortly after the statement by the OLA leader, government spokeswoman Billene Seyoum denounced the ties between the two groups. She also accused the dissident movements – which are designated as terrorist organisations – of “leading destructive activities against the stability of the nation”.



More concretely, Prime Minister Ahmed has undertaken efforts to bolster the federal counteroffensive. First, on 10 August, Ahmed called on “all capable Ethiopians” to join national and regional armed forces to combat the TPLF and its armed wing, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF). Ahmed went to note that “now is the right time for all capable Ethiopians who are of age to join the defence forces, special forces, and militias and show your patriotism”.



The most significant counter-response though, came from the United States (US) and European Union (EU) in a series of communiques. EU officials published an internal memorandum on 20 August stating that Eritrea was sending reinforcements across the border into Tigray. The memorandum, which was seen by the Reuters news agency, claims that Eritrean troops had already deployed to western Tigray, and had taken up defensive positions, armed with tanks and artillery, near the towns of Adi Goshu and Humera. The EU memorandum was echoed on 23 August by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who noted in a statement that the US is concerned that large numbers of Eritrean forces have re-entered Ethiopia after withdrawing in June.



Eritrea’s re-entry into the Tigray conflict follows a meeting between Ahmed and his Eritrean counterpart, Isaias Afwerki, in Asmara, while the Ethiopian prime minister was en route to Turkey on 17 August.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-assessment">Assessment</h2>



The formal declaration of ties between the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) confirms long-held suspicions that the Oromo militant group serves as a proxy for the Tigray organisation. Allegiances between groups from rival ethnicities to challenge a mutual enemy are relatively common in Ethiopia’s history, and have been a strategy used to some success by the TPLF. The most significant among such alliances was the country’s former ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). This was the outcome of an alliance between myriad ethnic organisations – including Tigray, Oromo and Amharan entities – pieced together in the 1980s by the TPLF to challenge the Marxist Derg regime of former dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. After being dislodged from power in 2018, the TPLF also relied on proxies in the Somali region to destabilise the erstwhile nascent administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. However, the insurrection – by the region’s Liyu police and other security bodies – was successfully snuffed out by the federal government.



The attack by the OLA may portend an uptick in the group’s activity following the confirmation of ties with the TPLF, while giving some indication of the strategy that it is likely to deploy in its insurgency. For one, it is common among insurgent groups to commemorate new ties with “spectacular” attacks. Moreover, as per its apparent agreement with the TPLF, the OLA is likely to open a new front in its operational strongholds in western Oromia, southern Amhara, eastern Benishangul-Gumuz and the northern SNNPR administrative regions. Here, it may use guerrilla tactics to target federal, regional, and civilian interests. There is a marginal concern that it may undertake a campaign of economic sabotage, manifest as an attack on key infrastructure linked to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is situated in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. However, the group has yet to include such tactics in its modus operandi. Most concerningly, it may seek to exacerbate ethnic cleavages between the Oromo, Amhara and Gumuz people in its areas of operation through targeted attacks that are intended to catalyse a more organic cycle of violence, especially between the Amhara and Oromo communities. In addition to further destabilising western Ethiopia, such violence could compromise ties between the Oromo-led federal government and Amharan regional authorities.



In the political realm, the OLA and TPLF will seek to establish ties with groups from other regions that share a common enemy in the federal government. In Oromia, they may reach out to the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF); and in Amhara, they may reach out to the National Movement of Amhara (NAMA). At the outset, the OFC, OLF and NAMA will likely be sceptical of any allegiance with the TPLF given the fact that the leadership of all three groups was persecuted under the TPLF-led EPRDF. Nevertheless, precedent suggests that the groups could be brought together by common grievances with the leadership of Ahmed – whose perceived authoritarian slant is seen as increasingly similar to that of the EPRDF – and a shared ideology in ethnic federalism. In the event that such a coalition is formalised, the groups could lead a civic campaign in their respective regions of Oromia and Amhara, akin to the anti-government protests of 2016. Their engagement in more combative resistance can also not be ruled out.



The decision by the federal government to authorise the return of Eritrean forces indicates that it is struggling to contain the TPLF-led insurgency; however, Eritrean forces could shift the battleground initiative. The offensive by the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) – codenamed Operation Alula – has seen the organisation reclaim large swathes of territory in Tigray that were held by federal forces. Frontlines have also shifted from deep within Tigray to the doorsteps of Amhara and Afar. Given the prospect of an uptick in activity by the OLA, the federal government and its allies may struggle to contain the plurality of threats. In light of this, the redeployment of Eritrean forces is strategically sound. As was the case in the early stages of the conflict, Eritrea’s entry will force the TDF to fight on multiple fronts against two state armies and a plurality of regional armies. While the Tigray group has demonstrated significant battleground prowess thus far given the success of Operation Alula, it may not be able to withstand the multipronged assault. In the immediate term, rather than sue for peace, it is more likely to abandon its conventional offensive and return to more guerrilla tactics.



While Eritrean forces could shift the balance of the conflict in favour of the federal government, it will come at a political and diplomatic cost. Given deep-seated animosity towards the Eritreans, especially in Tigray, their reinforced presence will further dampen public perception towards Ahmed and his administration. Accordingly, it may be leveraged by the TPLF as a recruitment mechanism and a means to persuade other groups to join its cause. Diplomatically, it will reignite concerns over human rights violations, given Eritrean forces’ reputed disregard for international norms. Depending on the nature and scale of violations – and the degree to which Ethiopian forces are complicit – this could result in the imposition of bilateral sanctions on the Ethiopian government and hamper engagement with multilateral institutions.

Signal Risk on Ethiopia – My enemy’s enemy

According to media reports, analysed data for South Africa suggests that the current wave of infections (wave 3) is expected to end around the end of August 2021, but that estimates indicate the fourth wave could start around 2 December – comparable to wave 3 with an expected new variant of the virus by then and lasting about 75 days. This kind of reporting demonstrates how data science has played a crucial role in managing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.



The practical application of theoretical knowledge during these crisis times has resulted in everything from improving situational awareness to conducting epidemiological modelling, performing network analytics, and even holding randomised controlled trials. It remains important to keep using different approaches and constantly incorporate new information so that forecasts are always as accurate as possible. The appearance of new mutation virus variants is notably difficult to predict and could impact the assumptions of each model – pointing at the need of an agile data science environment that can robustly work with new information.



It has become evident that one data set often reveals a piece of the puzzle. But when linking multiple data sources, a much bigger narrative becomes visible. It is this data linkage that becomes critical to also helping understand social determinants of health, amongst others, which inform effective policy and intervention. Simply put, data and its analysis have made a discernible difference in how society reacts to this crisis. It is helping governments and healthcare organisations around the world find more effective ways to deliver better outcomes.



If anything, the pandemic has highlighted the need to have access to even more data and advanced technologies that can analyse that data as effectively and quickly as possible. The reason for this is clear even as South Africa has recently seen the decline of the third wave of infections – there remains continued concern about shortages in hospital resources, including hospital beds, ventilators and personal protective equipment.



Data science, and the associated modelling, can assist government health organisations and hospitals predict patient hospitalisation rates and plan resources accordingly. Throughout this, partnerships between public and private sector entities are crucially important. The former can provide an enabling environment to affect change while the latter can deliver on the technology and data analytics requirements critically important to inform decision-making processes.



Yes, governments hold much of the critical data needed to understand current conditions during an outbreak. However, it is analytics that provide them with the ability to synthesise this data with other non-health (social indicators) and non-governmental data to get the most insights from this unified data. Additionally, analytics can deliver insights about the spread of a disease and the effectiveness of public health action, which can improve the response.



Of course, analysing data is a complex process that is significantly impacted by the rate at which it [the data] is growing especially given how quickly the pandemic spread globally. Given the life and death scenario that has played itself out numerous times over the past +/- 18-months, data analysis must be held to a higher standard to decipher it and glean insights to stem the flow of the pandemic. Therefore, to overcome the crisis, much comes down to collecting data, using it to help understand more about how COVID-19 spreads, and harnessing insights to prevent or limit the effects of future pandemics.



Epidemiologists track disease outbreaks using statistics. The likes of cumulative frequency graphs and exponential growth curves have been shared widely to help visualise the growth of the disease and understand when the growth might be peaking. And then mapping dashboards show where cluster outbreaks are occurring. This empowers government and health officials to develop area-specific models and dashboards that help allocate critical healthcare resources. This can also significantly assist when it comes to region-specific lockdown regulations and highlight hot zones where infections are high.



The pandemic has shown how real-world data science entails being part of interdisciplinary teams. It is not about the beauty of an algorithm or the choice of programming language. It is about having a concerted will, a unified mission, and a common goal to analyse data across environments to help improve responses and provide guidance on where best to allocate resources.

COVID-19 and data science: Modelling a pandemic

*This analysis was produced by the team at Signal Risk 



The International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded two weeks of virtual discussions with Seychellois authorities on 06 July. Following the conclusion of the meetings, the IMF confirmed that it had reached a staff-level agreement on an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with local officials, which is estimated at roughly USD 107 million and expected to extend over a 28-month period. The agreement is awaiting final approval from the IMF’s executive board, which is expected to convene in the coming weeks.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-arrivals-on-the-up">Arrivals on the up</h2>



Following the discussions, IMF mission head Boriana Yontcheva noted that the local economy is showing signs of recovery following an unprecedented GDP contraction of 13.5 percent in 2020. According to Yontcheva, the return to growth is driven by an uptick in the local tourism industry (which, in conjunction with related industries, accounts for up to two thirds of annual output).



This uptick was most clearly evidenced in a report released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on 12 July, which described a six-fold increase in tourist arrivals from the first to second quarters of 2021. As per the NBS, the country recorded 44,000 visitors in the second quarter, compared to 7,000 in the first.



The NBS data also revealed another positive development for the sector. Since Seychelles re-opened its borders in March, the majority of visitors have been from non-traditional markets (namely Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel). This is largely believed to reflect the recent resumption of airlinks – such as those operated by Russian carrier AEROFLOT and the UAE’s Emirates airlines – between Seychelles and these markets.



According to a spokesperson for the tourism department, officials are hoping that arrivals from Seychelles’ main markets – Germany, France and the United Kingdom – will pick up towards the end of the year. Should the projected rally in the tourism sector proceed as planned, the IMF notes that the local economy could grow by over 7 percent in 2021.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Bridging the gaps</h2>



The government is hoping that the projected recovery will grant it some breathing room to shore up both internal and external buffers. The tourism department estimated that revenue from the sector shrunk by 61 percent (USD 322 million) in 2020. Combined with a substantive increase in healthcare, stimulus, and social protection spending, IMF data indicates that Seychelles recorded a 16.3 percent budgetary deficit in 2020 (compared to a 2.8 percent surplus recorded in 2019). Financing the sizeable deficit saw a historic increase in public debt to 98 percent of GDP in 2020, up from 58 percent in 2019.



The external position saw a similar deterioration amid a fall in foreign earnings; the current account deficit expanded to 28 percent of GDP in 2020, from the 16 percent deficit recorded in 2019. Seychelles was able to bridge the balance of payments shortfall through external credit, such as a USD 31 million emergency loan secured through the IMF in May 2020.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Shot success</h2>



The recent rebound in tourist arrivals reflects efforts by authorities to promote Seychelles as a safe travel destination amid the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. To this end, Seychelles became the first African country to roll out a coronavirus vaccination programme in January. Since then, health officials have administered 140,000 doses of either the Chinese-manufactured Sinopharm or United Kingdom-developed AstraZeneca (Covishield) vaccines, and have fully inoculated 68,000 citizens (equivalent to 70 percent of the population) – a higher proportion of its population relative to most countries in the world.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Exposure</h2>



Despite the extent of inoculations, Seychelles was unable to ward off a marked uptick in coronavirus infection rates that began in January and peaked in mid-May. Coronavirus cases increased from 275 recorded on 01 January to 17,005 on 14 July. According to authorities, the uptick in case numbers is



due to a number of factors, including the reopening of the economy to tourist arrivals in March and the emergence of the more virulent Delta variant of coronavirus in the archipelago.



The increase in infection rates was accompanied by an elevated mortality rate. Seychelles recorded its first coronavirus-related death in early January; as of 14 July, this figure stands at 77. As a result, authorities tightened certain containment measures in early May. These included the three-week closure of schools; shortening the operating hours of stores; and a ban on group sporting activities and conferences. The tourism department was quick to reassure potential visitors that the regulations would not impinge on travel and tourist activities.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Assessment</h2>



A return to pre-pandemic levels of GDP will take several years to achieve. Due to the extent of the 2020 recession, the best-case scenario is that the economy will be able to return to its pre-pandemic output level by end-2022/early 2023. For the most part, this is on account of the rate at which tourists are expected to return to the country. Current estimates suggest that, by end-2021, arrivals are only expected to reach roughly 40 percent of the 428,000 visitors received in 2019. The pace of the arrivals is expected to pick up in 2022, with estimates that monthly arrivals could reach 2019 levels by the end of the third quarter of 2022. While Seychelles’ economic outlook is positive, it remains vulnerable to external shocks due to its dependency on tourism. Possible risks include lower-than-expected demand in key markets and disruptions in the global aviation industry.



Authorities are expected to embark on a package of economic reforms over the short-to-medium term. These will prioritise fiscal and structural measures and will be conducted in step with the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) board is expected to approve in due course. Budgetary and debt sustainability will be particularly important in this regard. This was confirmed on 06 July by finance minister Naadir Hassan when he stated that “reforms are needed to ensure that the government becomes more disciplined with its finances, which in other words, means that we will have to do more with less”. As a result of consolidation efforts, the internal deficit is expected to contract to 9.7 percent of GDP in 2021 (compared to the 16.3 percent deficit in 2020). Relatedly, public debt is set to hover around 100 percent of GDP in 2021 before beginning to decline in 2022. In a similar vein, increased foreign exchange earnings from tourism are expected to see the current account deficit narrow to 22 percent of GDP in 2021, from a deficit of 28 percent in 2020. The notion that the economy is beginning to stabilise is supported by a statement issued by Fitch Ratings on 28 May, in which it maintained Seychelle’s sovereign rating at sub-investment grade B with a stable outlook.



The government has displayed the necessary competence to contain the coronavirus outbreak over the long term. At present, the local outbreak appears to be stabilising. Total active cases have declined to 856 as of 14 July, down from 2,739 recorded on 16 May at the peak of the recent wave. Although active case numbers remain relatively elevated, the country’s health system does not appear to have come under any undue pressure. Despite the increase in transmission rates and deaths witnessed in the first half of the year, the national coronavirus vaccination programme is still regarded as among the most effective in the world. As noted by President Wavel Ramkalawan in a May interview, the majority of people who had been hospitalised for coronavirus had not received the vaccination prior to being infected. On the whole, a combination of targeted containment measures and an extensive vaccination campaign should equip Seychelles to weather future waves.



The local political landscape will remain stable following President Ramkalawan’s victory in the 2020 general elections. Ramkalawan achieved a convincing victory in the general election held in October 2020; he defeated incumbent Danny Faure in the presidential leg, while his LDS party secured a two-thirds majority in the 35-seat National Assembly. Speaking to the overall credibility of the elections, Faure conceded defeat on 25 October 2020 after the electoral commission had confirmed the results. Due to the clear mandate received by Ramkalawan in the recent polls, his administration is not expected to face any significant political challenges until the next general elections in 2025.

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