The global economy faces profound uncertainties, particularly in the face of the&nbsp;<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/covid-19">COVID-19</a>&nbsp;pandemic. In addition, faith in the efficacy of international bodies such as the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm">World Trade Organisation</a>&nbsp;(WTO) has been weakened by a power struggle between China and the US.



As the process for appointing a new head of the organisation moves into its final phase, it’s worth considering what front runner Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala could bring to the complex role of managing an international organisation, including designing and implementing reforms.



The WTO&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm">describes itself</a>&nbsp;as a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements. A key objective of the WTO is the liberalisation of trade for the mutual benefit of its members. This concept has become a divisive issue as a result of the perceived imbalances in the rights and obligations of members and the perceived uneven distribution of the gains from trade.



Okonjo-Iweala would be in a position to use her multifaceted experiences to energise the WTO’s 164 members to work harder to achieve the value of the multilateral trade systems. Given her experience in being able to diplomatically manage people and institutions resistant to change, she could also provide the impetus for member countries to overcome the challenges that have paralysed the trade organisation for years.



Okonjo-Iweala has gained acute negotiation skills from her experiences in negotiating with institutions and countries, as she did when she negotiated for Nigeria’s debts relief.



In addition, Okonjo-Iweala has held top positions in several international bodies, including corporates as well as not for profit organisations. Her ability to serve in senior positions in these disparate cultural settings means that she will be able to navigate the complex terrain of an organisation that has a mandate to serve the interests of 164 member states.



Her international exposure also means that she has developed an extensive network across the globe which she is bound to call on in the WTO job.



In addition, Okonjo-Iweala has a proven track record in carrying out successful reforms both at the World Bank and as the&nbsp;<a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/reforming-unreformable">finance minister in Nigeria</a>. Carrying out these reforms would have required negotiating with various constituencies.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-early-days">The early days</h2>



Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala was born to a royal family of Chukwuka and Kamene Okonjo on 13 June 1954, in Delta State, Nigeria. Her parents were both professors at the University of Ibadan. She completed secondary school at the International School Ibadan and St. Anne’s School, Molete, Ibadan. The young Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala proceeded to Harvard University. She graduated in 1977 with honours in economics. She went on to complete a PhD in regional economics and development at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.



Okonjo-Iweala’s professional life points to decades in the thick of economic policy – global as well as local.



She worked for many years at the World Bank where she started as an intern. After gaining her PhD she returned to the bank to work as a development economist. She was to spend 25 years at the institution, rising to the position of vice president.



Okonjo-Iweala spearheaded several World Bank initiatives to assist low income countries during the&nbsp;<a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16505?locale-attribute=en">2008-2009 food and financial crises</a>. For example, as managing director of the World Bank from 2007 to 2011, she had oversight responsibility for the World Bank’s $81 billion operational portfolio in Africa, South Asia, Europe and Central Asia.



In 2010, she was chair of the World Bank’s successful drive to raise $49.3 billion in grants and low interest credit for the poorest countries in the world.



<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/apr/16/world-bank-president-jim-kim">In 2012</a>&nbsp;she became the first female and black candidate to contest for the presidency of World Bank Group. She lost to Jim Yong Kim, the president of Dartmouth College.



Having worked for about 25 years in the World Bank, negotiating and pushing for progressive agreement and development, Okonjo-Iweala has developed keenly honed negotiation skills.



In addition, she is an outsider to the WTO who offers the comprehensive skills and experience needed to shake up the organisation and bring progress to world trade. Her African origin places her on political neutral ground, enabling her, among other things, to objectively mediate issues between China and US.



These skills and traits also mean that she’s in a strong position to build a trade institution where there is greater trust among its members.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-her-service-to-nigeria">Her service to Nigeria</h2>



In 2003, she was appointed Nigeria’s minister of finance by the then President Olusegun Obasanjo. She became the first female finance minister and had several reforms to her credit.



As minister of finance in Nigeria, she spearheaded negotiations with the Paris Club of Creditors&nbsp;<a href="https://www.cgdev.org/topics/nigerian-debt-relief#:%7E:text=In%20October%202005%2C%20Nigeria%20and,of%20any%20Paris%20Club%20debt.">that led to the wiping out of $30 billion of Nigeria’s debt</a>, including the outright cancellation of $18 billion.



She had several battles with powerful political interests in Nigeria. She slashed the number of agencies in the country. She drastically cut fuel subsidies in a subsidy scheme that was enmeshed in a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/19/nigeria-fuel-subsidy-scheme-corruption">difficult web of corruption</a>&nbsp;that made the country lose $6.8bn over a three-year period.



Okonjo-Iweala introduced practical economic reforms which changed the worldview of Nigeria as seemingly hopeless and comatose. She turned around the largest economy in Africa.



Nigeria, for the first time in history, had electronic financial management reforms. She also introduced macroeconomic reforms and many policy strategies like a medium term expenditure framework and medium term budgeting.



For a brief period in 2006, Okonjo-Iweala served as Nigeria’s first female minister of foreign affairs. After resigning from government she set up a research organisation, NOI Polls.



In 2011 she was reappointed as minister of finance and coordinating minister of the economy by the then President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan. She served in the position until 2015. In that time, Nigeria’s economic growth rate remained at an average of 6% per annum.



Under her leadership, Nigeria’s Bureau of Statistics&nbsp;<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-06/nigerian-economy-overtakes-south-africa-s-on-rebased-gdp">rebased the gross domestic product</a>for the time first in 24 years. This saw Nigeria emerge as the largest economy in Africa. She took a lot of heat for the government’s decision to remove the fuel subsidy. Protests ensued and the policy was reversed.



I have no doubt in my mind that Okonjo-Iweala would be an exemplary leader of the global trade organisation because she would balance policies between the advanced economies and developing ones to achieve sustainable global economic growth and development.

Okonjo-Iweala

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: how global and local experience would play out in WTO top job

The COVID-19 crisis is one of many indicators that we live in dangerous and uncertain times. Others include the international community’s struggle to respond to technological and climate change, demographic shifts, growing poverty and inequality as well as increased global insecurity.



The global governance arrangements for managing these changes are no longer fit for purpose. Take the decision making procedures in the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">UN Security Council</a>&nbsp;and the International Monetary Fund&nbsp;<a href="https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm">(IMF)</a>. They don’t account for the growing importance of developing countries. Nor do they meaningfully accommodate non-state actors such as transnational corporations and civil society groups.



These changes are pushing countries to reassess how they use foreign policy to serve their national interests. A recently published book,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/edited-collections/values-interests-and-power-south-african-foreign-policy-in-uncertain-times">Values, Interest and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times</a>, contributes to such a reassessment in South Africa. The book was co-edited by foreign relations expert Elizabeth Sidiropoulos and me.



In the book, a group of senior and junior South African authors offer suggestions on how the country can formulate and implement a foreign policy that responds to a changing global world.



We maintain that foreign policy making should be guided by the national interest. The South African&nbsp;<a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>&nbsp;provides important guidance on this. This is because it’s a product of the country’s history, politics and culture. It expresses its values and aspirations.



On foreign policy, it allocates responsibilities and authority among the different branches of government. It also instructs relevant government authorities to base their foreign policy on the values expressed in the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf">bill of rights</a>.



Subject to these constraints, policy makers are free to determine foreign policy priorities according to their view of the country’s economic, geo-strategic, political, cultural, environmental and security interests.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-recommendation">Recommendation</h2>



The book concludes with some recommendations for South Africa’s foreign policy makers.



First, foreign policy should:



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>contribute to implementing the domestic economic and social transformation agenda,</li><li>be consistent with the values and governance arrangements set out in the constitution,</li><li>position South Africa to be a norm entrepreneur in global affairs. This means pursuing creative and principled solutions to global issues,</li><li>advocate reforms to global governance arrangements so that they become more responsive to the concerns of the global South. And become more accountable.</li></ul>



Secondly, we recommend changing the way which foreign policy is designed. The Presidency should establish an inter-agency coordinating council that can formulate a coherent and effective foreign policy. The&nbsp;<a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/index.html">Department of International Relations and Cooperation</a>&nbsp;should then lead implementation.



Our third recommendation is that Parliament and the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-09.pdf">Chapter 9 institutions</a>&nbsp;should play a role in foreign policy making. These institutions support the country’s constitutional democracy. For example, the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.sahrc.org.za/">Human Rights Commission</a>&nbsp;could issue an annual report assessing how effectively the government has used international relations to advance human rights at home.



In addition, there should be an annual meeting with these bodies to discuss the government’s foreign policy objectives for the year ahead. This could be run by the executive through the Presidency or the foreign relations department.



Fourthly, we recommend that a concerted effort be made to ensure that foreign service staff have the technical and language skills to deal with the expanding range of issues facing the country on the global arena. Equally important, they should also understand the links between domestic social and economic transformation and foreign policy.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-top-of-mind-topics">Top of mind topics</h2>



We also make recommendations on specific topics.



Economic development and cooperation:&nbsp;South Africa needs to pay attention to its trade and economic relations, particularly in Africa. For example, the new&nbsp;<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-africas-free-trade-area-offers-so-much-promise-93827">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>&nbsp;should open important trading and job creating opportunities. It will also help develop regional value chains.



We recommend that the government, business, labour and other stakeholders develop an integrated strategy to take advantage of these opportunities.



Climate change:&nbsp;The country has played an important leadership role in the global&nbsp;<a href="https://www.environment.gov.za/projectsprogrammes/donorfunded/unfccc">United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</a>&nbsp;negotiations.



<figure class="wp-block-image"><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370292/original/file-20201119-15-qrhl1w.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" alt=""/></figure>



To continue playing this role credibly, it should reduce the inconsistencies between its domestic and global climate change related policies. In particular, it needs to stress in both arenas the important relationship between climate change and social justice.



Peace and security:&nbsp;South Africa should draw lessons from its experiences in African peacemaking about how it can help African regional bodies end conflicts.



We also recommend that the country develops a maritime strategy. This is important for two reasons. First, South Africa is bounded by two major oceans. Its exclusive economic zone is bigger than its land mass. Second, external actors are becoming increasingly interested in the Indian Ocean. They see it as part of a bigger maritime space stretching from the Pacific to the east coast of Africa. Without such a strategy, it will be difficult for the country to protect its interests.



The multilateral system:&nbsp;Middle sized powers like South Africa need a reformed multilateral system. It should, therefore, continue to be engaged in the debates on reforming it.



Given resource constraints, it needs to focus on institutions where reform is feasible. These include the World Trade Organisation, the IMF and the World Bank. Reforms should focus on creating greater voice for underrepresented countries, and more public accountability and transparency.



South Africa should also use its platform in global forums like the&nbsp;<a href="https://g20.org/en/about/Pages/whatis.aspx">G20</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/brics-brazil-russia-india-china-south-africa-1">BRICS</a>&nbsp;to promote issues of concern to Africa, and to foster greater inter-regional cooperation.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-need-for-coherence">Need for coherence</h2>



A foreign policy that looks incoherent – or is merely reactive – can have both reputational and material costs. We hope this book contributes to improving the gains the country can make from its international relations.

south-african-flag-1486137288VYk

How values, interests and power must shape South Africa’s foreign policy

The United States and Kenya formally launched negotiations for a free trade agreement on 8 July 2020. With the US gearing up for presidential elections in a few months, these talks may not draw much global attention. But as&nbsp;<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-solo-what-significance-us-kenya-free-trade-agreement">a prototype for evaluating the substance of future US-Africa trade</a>&nbsp;relations, a lot rides on Washington using this deal to make a bold statement of its commitment to effective North-South free trade agreements.



The US is the third most important destination for Kenyan exports after Uganda and Pakistan,&nbsp;<a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ken">accounting for 8% of its total exports</a>. Kenya exported goods worth US$ 527 million in 2018, primarily apparels, coffee and nuts. Its imports were mainly commercial aeroplanes and other spacecraft, polymers and medicaments. Kenya has a slim trade surplus that the US will probably be keen to balance.



Washington has a penchant for using free trade agreements to signal the status of partner states as regional strategic allies. Such agreements with Morocco, South Korea, Colombia and Bahrain were all intended to signal much deeper strategic alliances beyond trade.



For the European Union and China the Kenyan agreement further signals America’s intent for commercial expansion and competition in Africa. The principal objective is to secure duty free access for American industrial, apparel and agricultural goods in Africa. Its all about making American exports competitive.



US trade officials have described the Kenyan deal as a&nbsp;<a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/march/trump-administration-notifies-congress-intent-negotiate-trade-agreement-kenya">model</a>&nbsp;for other African free trade deals. Terming Kenya a “strategic partner, regional leader and commercial hub”&nbsp;<a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-between-the-united-states-and-kenya-on-the-launch-of-negotiations-towards-a-free-trade-agreement/">statements</a>from both the US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and the US ambassador to Kenya Kyle McCarter highlight the seriousness with which Washington wants this deal done.



This vigour affirms President Trump’s strategy outlined by the 2018 US-Africa policy. But since the Kenyan deal is an&nbsp;<a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/march/trump-administration-notifies-congress-intent-negotiate-trade-agreement-kenya">initiative </a>&nbsp;of President Trump, the palpable pressure to conclude agreement could be detrimental to Kenya’s interests. The pressure hampers Kenya more given the asymmetry of capacity between the two states.



Free trade agreements are protracted affairs which take more than a year to complete. The US-Morocco agreement, for instance, took 15 months. Talks with Peru (18 months) and Colombia (20 months) lasted even longer. The Kenya-EU economic partnership agreements took more than 10 years to conclude.



Additionally, there’s no guarantee that Trump will be in office come January 2021. For this reason, Kenya’s team in Washington should consider informally engaging the democrats in case the deal has to be concluded under President Biden.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Kenya’s negotiating objectives</h2>



It is my view that Kenya’s negotiations should be guided by four principal questions and objectives as follows:



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Does the proximity of the November election in the US unduly compromise the quality of negotiations?</li><li>What are the prospects for renewal of the&nbsp;<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)</a>&nbsp;in 2025? If extended, would Kenyan exports not covered benefit from US tariff removal?</li><li>Can Kenyan negotiators defend against US pressure to liberalise industrial goods under the East African Community Sensitive List and</li><li>Can the US extend to Kenya the “qualified industrial zones” model to bolster US foreign direct investment in Kenya?</li></ul>



From a political perspective, a trade agreement makes sense. It shields Kenya from the uncertainties over the extension of the African deal and the vicissitudes of political party changes in Washington. As a trade tool, the merits of a free trade agreement depend a lot on the extension (or not) of AGOA after 2025 under President Trump or Biden.



More principally, whether democrats or Republicans win in November, the extension of the Africa market access law will depend on the extent to which sub-Saharan Africa states will be regarded as important flashpoints for US-China commercial competition in Africa.



Trump is certainly more combative in wanting to nullify China’s huge commercial advantage in Africa. But a Biden presidency would be more receptive to the appeals of the&nbsp;<a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/15634-us-house-black-caucus-to-advocate-extension-of-agoa.html">US Congress Black Caucus which champions</a>&nbsp;the unilateral extension of AGOA. Because of the uncertainty about the whims of the US presidency, it is in Kenya’s interest to concurrently lobby US democrats on the importance of this deal in case of a Biden presidency.



If AGOA is not extended without a free trade agreement, Kenya’s three biggest exports to the US –&nbsp;<a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ken">apparels, macadamia nuts and cut flowers</a>&nbsp;– would face duty increases of 5%, 0.5% and 4% respectively. This would undoubtedly negatively affect exports.



But if it is extended, and the US-Kenya agreement ratified by Congress, elimination of duties on Kenyan non-AGOA exports (mainly minerals) will not amount to much in terms of export enhancement.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Jordanian model</h2>



Constraints to Kenyan exports to the US are not primarily tariff based. From Kenya’s standpoint, therefore, these trade talks are less about tariff and trade, than they are about attracting foreign investment into Kenya. The most useful potential outcome will be the extent to which Kenya draws manufacturing foreign direct investment from the US and other states, into its economic processing zones.



To achieve this, Kenya should negotiate for liberal rules of origin requirements. Such rules should not unduly constrain investors to use only US or Kenyan inputs for Kenyan exports to qualify for the duty free entry into the US. A rules-of-origin threshold of no more than 30% value add should be the target.



As an investment vehicle, the Kenya US agreement should be modelled on the Jordanian “qualified industrial zones model” which increased bilateral trade between the two states&nbsp;<a href="https://jo.usembassy.gov/us-jordan-joint-committee-meets-in-amman-praises-7-5-percent-increase-in-jordanian-exports-to-the-united-states-in-2018/">tenfold since its inception in 2001</a>.



This model permits foreign owned companies situated in select export processing zones to qualify for duty free exports into the US market. With apparel as Kenya’s principal target export, the success of its negotiating dexterity will be judged on how well it integrates the inputs and outputs of its export processing zones. An agreement that considers all apparel exports “Kenyan” irrespective of ownership and input source for a reasonable duration should be the target.



Finally, the US will no doubt be keen on Kenya’s liberalisation of agriculture and services as part of its ambition to compete with the EU as preeminent agricultural exporters. Every country keeps a short list of goods that it is allowed to protect either for infant industry protection or security reasons. Kenya’s highly protected commodities include wheat, matches, rice and cement which can attract customs tariffs of up to 75% in the case of certain types of rice.



My view here is that Kenya should grant the US the same agricultural exports conditions as those granted to the EU under the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13865-epa-test-of-unity-as-kenya-breaks-away.html">Economic Partnership Agreement</a>. But at the same time, it should defend the continued protection of the “industrial” goods in the sensitive list such as cement, natural gas and most importantly worn clothing. These should be protected for purposes of the modest infant industry already in existence in production of these products. But it could end protection for some agricultural products like wheat.



If properly negotiated the agreement has the potential to rapidly enhance Kenya’s foreign industrial investment and overall export volumes. To do so, Kenya must pay more attention to the role of this agreement as an investment attraction vehicle and not just a simple tariff centred ‘traditional’ pact.

Uhuru_Kenyatta_2015

Kenya-US free trade talks are under way: what Nairobi must get right from start

<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-05/more-bailout-cash-may-just-delay-wave-of-credit-card-defaults?sref=Hjm5biAW">Millions of Americans are unemployed</a>&nbsp;and looking for work.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.nr0.htm">Hiring continues</a>, but there’s far more demand for jobs than supply.



As scholars of&nbsp;<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ojhiOlgAAAAJ&amp;hl=en&amp;oi=ao">human resources</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=D2pc8ugAAAAJ&amp;hl=en&amp;oi=ao">management</a>, we believe artificial intelligence could be a boon for job seekers who need an edge in a tight labor market like today’s.



What’s more,&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2019.12.001">our research</a>&nbsp;suggests it can make the whole process of finding and changing jobs much less painful, more effective and potentially more lucrative.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Make me a match</h2>



Over the last three years, we’ve&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.09.009">intensely studied</a>&nbsp;the role of&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2019.07.004">AI in recruiting</a>. This research shows that job candidates are positively inclined to use AI in the recruiting process and find it more convenient than traditional analog approaches.



Although companies&nbsp;<a href="https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/12/20993665/artificial-intelligence-ai-job-screen">have been using</a>&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2019.12.001">AI in hiring</a>&nbsp;for a few years, job applicants have only recently begun to discover the power of artificial intelligence to help them in their search.



In the old days, if you wanted to see what jobs were out there, you had to go on a job board like&nbsp;<a href="https://www.monster.com/">Monster.com</a>, type in some keywords, and then get back hundreds or even thousands of open positions, depending on the keywords you used. Sorting through them all was a pain.



Today, with AI and companies like&nbsp;<a href="https://eightfold.ai/">Eightfold</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://skillroads.com/">Skillroads</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://fortay.co/">Fortay</a>, it is less about job search and more about matchmaking. You answer a few questions about your capabilities and preferences and provide a link to your&nbsp;<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/">LinkedIn</a>&nbsp;or other profiles. AI systems that have already logged not just open jobs but also analyzed the companies behind the openings – based on things like reputation, culture and performance – then produce match reports showing the best fits for you in terms of job and company.



Typically, there is an overall match score expressed as a percentage from 0% to 100% for each job. In many cases the report will even tell you which skills or capabilities you lack – or have not included – and how much their inclusion would increase your match score. The intent is to help you spend your time on opportunities that are more likely to result in your getting hired and being happy with the job and company after the hire.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Crafting a winning CV</h2>



Usually, when you look for a job, you apply to lots of openings and companies at the same time. That means two choices: save time by sending each one a mostly generic resume, with minor tweaks for each, or take the time and effort to adjust and tailor your resume to better fit specific jobs.



Today,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/516793/ai-tool-will-help-you-write-winning-resume">AI tools</a>&nbsp;can help customize your resume and cover letter for you. They can tell you what capabilities you might want to add to your resume, show how such additions would influence your chances of being hired and even rewrite your resume to better fit a specific job or company. They can also analyze you, the job and the company and craft a customized cover letter.



While researchers have not yet systemically examined the quality of human- versus AI-crafted cover letters, the AI-generated samples we’ve reviewed are difficult to distinguish from the ones we’ve seen MBA graduates write for themselves over the last 30 years as professors.&nbsp;<a href="https://twitter.com/ConversationUS/status/1291815439333330944">Try it for yourself</a>.



Granted, for lots of lower-level jobs, cover letters are relics of the past. But for higher-level jobs, they are still used as an&nbsp;<a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/why-cover-letters-are-important-2014-9">important screening mechanism</a>.



<figure class="wp-block-image"><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351645/original/file-20200806-24-1fy3xg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt="Images of two cover letters for a job application, one written by a real MBA student, the other by artificial intelligence."/><figcaption>One of these cover letters was written by an MBA student. The other was generated by artificial intelligence. Can you tell which one is which?&nbsp;Author provided,&nbsp;Author provided</figcaption></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Show me the money</h2>



Negotiations over compensation are another thorny issue in the job search.



Traditionally, applicants have been at a distinct informational disadvantage, making it harder to negotiate for the salary they may deserve based on what others earn for similar work. Now AI-enabled reports from&nbsp;<a href="https://www.payscale.com/">PayScale.com</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.salary.com/">Salary.com</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/salary/">LinkedIn Salary</a>&nbsp;and others provide salary and total compensation reports tailored to job title, education, experience, location and other factors. The data comes from company reported numbers, government statistics and self-reported compensation.



For self-reported data, the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.moneyunder30.com/best-salary-information-websites">best sites</a>&nbsp;conduct statistical tests to ensure the validity and accuracy of the data. This is only possible with large databases and serious number crunching abilities. PayScale.com, for example,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.payscale.com/about/use-our-data">has over 54 million respondents</a>&nbsp;in its database and surveys more than 150,000 people per month to keep its reports up-to-date and its database growing.



Although no academics have yet tested if these reports result in better compensation packages than in the old days,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4165077?seq=1">research has long established</a>&nbsp;that negotiating in general gets candidates better compensation offers, and that more information in that process is better than less.



[Deep knowledge, daily.&nbsp;<a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&amp;utm_medium=inline-link&amp;utm_campaign=newsletter-text&amp;utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Growing use of AI in hiring</h2>



Use of these tools is growing, especially among young people.



A survey&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.09.009">we conducted in 2018 found</a>&nbsp;that half of employed workers aged 18 to 36 said that they were likely or highly likely to use AI tools in the job search and application process. And 64% of these respondents felt that AI-enabled tools were more convenient.



Most of the research on the use of AI in the hiring process – including our own – has focused on recruitment, however, and the use of the technology&nbsp;<a href="https://www.oracle.com/a/ocom/docs/artificial-intelligence-in-talent-acquisition.pdf">is expected to double</a>&nbsp;over the next two years. We’ve found it to be&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2019.12.001">effective for companies</a>, so it seems logical that it can be very useful for job candidates as well. In fact, at least US$2 billion in investments are fueling human resources startups aimed at using AI to help job candidates, according to our analysis of&nbsp;<a href="https://www.crunchbase.com/hub/human-resources-startups#section-leaderboard">Crunchbase business data</a>.



While more research is needed to determine exactly how effective these AI-enabled tools actually are, Americans who lost their jobs due to the coronavirus could use all the help they can get.

web-network-technology-developer

Lost your job due to coronavirus? AI could be your best friend in finding a new one

COVID-19 has wrought havoc on poor households in countries across the world. In South Africa, more and more people are facing hunger resulting from&nbsp;<a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/cover-story/2020-07-15-the-jobs-reckoning-is-here/">mass job losses</a>&nbsp;and small, poorly implemented supplementary cash grants.



On top of this the pandemic has put in stark relief the country’s poorly understood food system, in which powerful firms operate with little oversight while vulnerable actors in the informal food sector face over-regulation.



When the country went into lockdown on 26 March 2020,&nbsp;<a href="http://www.dti.gov.za/news2020/FAQs-EssentialServices.pdf">government placed</a>&nbsp;the formal food sector at the centre of continued food supply. Informal food vendors were restricted. Yet these vendors provide an important source of food and livelihoods for the majority of South Africa’s population.



The South African constitution recognises the right to food. But the government’s failure to enact specific legislation on food rights has resulted in incoherent food security policies. Even the smallest increases in prices of products in the basic food basket can have a significant impact on poor households and in local markets. Therefore, access to affordable and nutritious food through formal and informal food markets is critical for ensuring people’s right to food.



In this article, we highlight indicators of a distressing rise in the prices of essential food products that is contributing to South Africa’s hunger crisis. We call for the urgent expansion of price controls to items in the basic household food basket, as well as an inquiry into the price-setting of major retailers.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Have food prices increased?</h2>



StatsSA recently&nbsp;<a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0141/P0141April2020.pdf">published</a>&nbsp;the headline urban consumer price index (CPI) as having&nbsp;decreased&nbsp;by 0.5% month-on-month in April 2020. But the statistics body&nbsp;<a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0141/P0141April2020.pdf">explicitly cautioned</a>&nbsp;that its new price collection strategy had been severely limited by the lockdown regulations. The headline number potentially reflects very different pricing behaviour of major retailers that have an online presence. Moreover, smaller retailers are excluded from this methodology – despite comprising half of poor household food spending based on data from the&nbsp;<a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0100/P01002011.pdf">Income and Expenditure Survey</a>&nbsp;of 2011.



Evidence of large price increases on essential food items is recorded by the NGO Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice and Dignity’s&nbsp;<a href="https://pmbejd.org.za/index.php/household-affordability-index/">price surveys</a>. They find an 8.2% increase in the price of a household food basket for the three-month period from 2 March to 3 June 2020. This includes large increases in the prices of essential food items at the local level over the period, such as an 18% increase for sugar beans and a 14% increase for brown bread.



Table 1: Month-on-month price increases for essential food items, March to April 2020



<figure class="wp-block-image"><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt=""/><figcaption>Source: StatsSA detailed weekly price data for April and PMBEJD weekly price data for April. Items have been matched by authors for comparability.</figcaption></figure>



Comparisons of the StatsSA and Pietermaritzburg surveys are limited by timing and availability of item specific data. But both sources show that prices of brown bread, eggs, potatoes, salt, and soup increased in March and April. These are essential food items not necessarily monitored under current COVID-19 regulations.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why is this not a Competition Commission case?</h2>



The price hikes have drawn the attention of the country’s Competition Commission. In a recent food price monitoring&nbsp;<a href="http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Essential-Food-Pricing-Monitoring-Report.pdf">report</a>&nbsp;it pointed out significant inflation in the prices of various food items. It commented that, in some cases, the increases and high margins were not justified by the changes in the operating costs of the suppliers.



<a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202004/43205rg43205gon448.pdf">Regulations</a>&nbsp;introduced in March after the government declared a state of disaster to manage the COVID-19 pandemic empowered competition agencies to investigate firms believed to be charging excessive prices for certain essential healthcare and food items. But not a lot has happened. Although 38% of the 320 complaints received by the competition commission by the end of June related to food prices, only one has so far led to an administrative penalty for a firm. This was the Food Lover’s Market case relating to the price of raw&nbsp;<a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-07-14-food-lovers-store-admits-to-charging-excessive-price-for-raw-ginger/">ginger</a>.



Cases of excessive pricing of goods and services are among the most difficult to prosecute. This is because of the complexities of determining the extent to which prices are high; relevant cost parameters that have to be considered; the reliability of benchmarks; and the availability of data.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What can be done?</h2>



During the most severe part of the lockdown in the country, the government addressed the issue of higher food prices by concluding an agreement with major retailers to limit price increases on key items. But this lapsed immediately after the first easing of the lockdown on 4 May. Since then retailers have&nbsp;<a href="http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Essential-Food-Pricing-Monitoring-Report.pdf">increased prices</a>&nbsp;of certain food items in response to higher input prices. We believe a renewed list of price limits should be put in place.



Along with capping price increases for key food items, we propose that the list of items subject to the price monitoring regime be broadened. The Competition Commission’s assessment – and our own – indicate that there has been some positive effect of the food price increase restrictions for food items already included in this list, such as maize meal and frozen chicken. But the published&nbsp;<a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/383217/new-regulations-bring-coronavirus-price-controls-for-certain-high-demand-products-heres-what-is-on-the-list/">list</a>&nbsp;of 22 critical products and categories, including 11 basic food items that are price-monitored, does not go far enough. The list of 11 food items leaves out brown bread and dried foods such as legumes, for example, which are staple foods for the poor and a major source of nutrition. The inclusion of frozen vegetables, on the other hand, points to poor targeting and a limited understanding of what constitutes the food basket of low-income households. Frozen vegetables are staples among middle-income households.



Table 2: Comparison of essential food baskets



<figure class="wp-block-image"><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt=""/><figcaption>Notes: Food poverty line basket compiled by the StatsSA. VAT zero-rated basic foodstuffs are defined by National Treasury/SARS. Price monitored goods are published by the National Consumer Commission list in Reg. 350 of Government Gazette No. 11057 of 19 March. PMBEJD household food basket is compiled in consultation with women living on low incomes in Pietermaritzburg.</figcaption></figure>



We recommend the urgent expansion of the list to include brown bread, fresh vegetables, eggs and sugar beans, among other products. A failure to do this may well reverse any positive impact of increasing the rand values of social grants. At its core, the right to food is about protecting people’s right to feed themselves.



While the expansion of social protection measures does in part contribute to access to food for poor and vulnerable households, government should play a role in monitoring and regulating the food sector to ensure a more equitable and sustainable food system for consumers and actors in informal food markets. Price limits should be complemented by an inquiry into the price-setting of major retailers. The weaknesses in the StatsSA pricing data highlighted above indicate the need for more comprehensive data to inform ongoing monitoring of food prices.



The effects of COVID-19 will endure for some time to come, including large-scale job losses, and so it is certainly not too late to intervene. Poorer South African households cannot continue to endure both a crisis of joblessness and food price increases.

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South Africa needs better food price controls to shield poor people from COVID-19 fallout

There is no shortage of technological innovations designed to boost animal agriculture in Africa. These range from&nbsp;<a href="https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/57322">GPS tracking systems</a>&nbsp;which identify and trace pastoralists’ herds to livestock vaccine&nbsp;<a href="https://www.cowtribe.com/">SMS services</a>&nbsp;that alert farmers to disease outbreaks.



But to unlock the economic potential of the sector as&nbsp;<a href="http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3706e.pdf">demand for meat and milk</a>&nbsp;swells threefold towards 2050, countries must invest in the critical areas that will improve quality across the whole value chain. That is increasing productivity and quality from the breeding of the animal throughout the production process to the end product. This includes safe storage, handling and sale.



My native Uganda offers some useful lessons from its use of smart investments in technology and farmer organisation. These have made it the only East African country that is&nbsp;<a href="http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/71178513/mwebaze_and_kjaer_article.pdf">self-sufficient in milk</a>.



In recent years, some private sector players in Uganda have invested in testing systems to detect aflatoxin in animal feeds. The goal is to prevent milk and meat contamination. Others have developed refrigeration units that are powered with&nbsp;<a href="https://energypedia.info/wiki/Biogas-Powered_Evaporative_Cooling_for_Uganda%E2%80%99s_Dairy_Industry">biogas</a>&nbsp;from manure. Both are among the innovations that improve the quality of the final product.



As highlighted by a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.mamopanel.org/resources/reports-and-briefings/meat-milk-more-policy-innovations-shepherd-inclusi/">new report</a>&nbsp;from the Malabo Montpellier Panel on which I sit, the same can be achieved elsewhere. It can also benefit other livestock commodities, to give Africa food sovereignty across animal-sourced foods and greater access to international markets.



The report makes 11 recommendations for Africa’s livestock sector. These range from technological innovations and supportive policies to addressing trade barriers and challenges specific to each commodity.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Priority areas</h2>



African nations must be strategic in prioritising the infrastructure that will make the most difference to quality and productivity. The first priority is to increase consumer awareness around food safety, nutrition and sustainability to kickstart demand for better quality products.



Partly as a response to European consumer expectations around quality and safety, for example, Morocco developed a new system for&nbsp;<a href="http://www.onssa.gov.ma/fr/sante-animale/identification-animale">animal identification and traceability</a>&nbsp;in 2015.



Livestock can be identified using electronic tags that communicate with the national database via mobile phone networks. This increases transparency and traceability. It also promotes Moroccan animal products on international markets such as the European Union.



The second priority is then to direct technology towards opportunities to open up market access.



To unlock trade means investing in improved animal health, processing operations, storage and distribution. Meeting regional and international standards for food safety and quality is a vital goal. Africa currently contributes 2.8% of the global meat market, which translates to 14 million tons. The continent produces just over 10% of the world’s milk.



There are a number of barriers to increasing this production and gaining greater market share. They include limited availability of quality animal feed, access to affordable energy needed in producing and processing livestock, and limited infrastructure, particularly in the last mile.



With meat and milk being perishable goods, innovation in the cold chain and sustainable energy supplies will help strengthen the sector.



For example, an East African&nbsp;<a href="https://www.heifer.org/our-work/flagship-projects/east-africa-dairy-development-project.html">initiative</a>&nbsp;which centralised milk quality testing and storage in chillers prior to sale increased yields sixfold within five years.



The volume of milk supplied to the 30km catchment area rose to three million litres a month. This increased income per smallholder household by more than 160% in Uganda, 120% in Kenya, and almost 65% in Rwanda.



The success of such projects in turn drives demand for continued innovation, such as solar-powered cold chains or interventions that protect other resources like water and grasslands.



Finally, countries also need to prioritise policies that support new technologies across the livestock sector.



To&nbsp;<a href="https://www.dda.or.ug/profile.html">transform</a>&nbsp;its milk production sector, Uganda privatised the state-owned processing company Dairy Corporation as well as creating a Dairy Development Authority.



The Dairy Industry Act of 1998 empowered the authority to enforce milk hygiene standards and quality controls. As a result, traders were licensed to meet public health and milk quality standards. This encouraged the modernisation of the sector through the expansion of pasteurisation plants and processing infrastructure as well as processing of high value products.



Certainly, the gains have trickled down to the farmers in better farm gate prices.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Conclusion</h2>



As the Malabo Montpellier Panel points out, many of the tools needed to tap into the potential of Africa’s livestock sector exist already. But with limited resources, they must be deployed smartly to improve the entire value chain.



Scaling up innovation at critical points will unlock new opportunities and help ensure animal agriculture keeps pace with a rising demand from a growing population.

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How smart investments in technology can beef up Africa’s economy

The next director-general of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) will replace Brazilian Roberto de Azevedo, who has served since 2013 and plans to step down at the end of August, a year before the conclusion of his term.



Of the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/wto-leadership-contenders-auditions-global-trade-body-200715090700814.html">eight candidates</a>&nbsp;who have thrown their hats into the ring, three are from Africa. They are the former Nigerian finance minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala; the former Kenyan foreign minister Amina Mohamed, who also previously served as chairperson of the WTO General Council; and Abdel-Hamid Mamdouhm, an Egyptian lawyer who is also an erstwhile WTO official.



The WTO does not operate on the basis of a regional rotation principle. But there is recognition that it has never been led by an African since its creation in 1995. Africa represents a key bloc within the WTO.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wto.org/">It accounts</a>&nbsp;for nearly 27% of membership and 35% of members from developing countries.



Past directors-general have come from Europe, Oceania, Asia and South America.



The challenges facing the WTO are numerous and complex. Since&nbsp;<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/07/267842-collapse-doha-round-global-trade-talks-disappointing-says-ban">the collapse</a>&nbsp;of the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/update_e.htm">Doha Round of trade talks</a>, the multilateral trade system has stalled and it needs to be revived. Launched in 2001, the Doha Round failed to respond to the development interests of poor countries, most of which are African.



The organisation has also been at the receiving end of&nbsp;<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/09/trumps-real-trade-war-is-being-waged-on-the-wto/">persistent attacks</a>&nbsp;from the Trump administration, which has accused it of failing to protect American interests. This has been aggravated by trade wars between the US and China. And the organisation’s dispute settlement system has been&nbsp;<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50736344">paralysed</a>&nbsp;by the refusal of the US to approve appointments of judges to its appellate body.



Concerns have also been voiced by the US, Japan and the European Union (EU) about the WTO’s rules. There’s a strong lobby to have them modernised to take account of the impact of the rise of developing countries and Chinese industrial subsidies. The EU, in particular, has protested against the overuse of the “special and differential treatment” rules designed to afford poor nations more favourable trade terms,&nbsp;<a href="https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122306.pdf">regarding this as creating a second tier membership</a>.



What’s more, Washington, Brussels and Tokyo have jointly formulated proposals&nbsp;<a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3046108/us-eu-and-japan-target-china-new-global-trade-rules">to curtail state support to businesses and industries</a>.



Also, the WTO has had to grapple with&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/serv_29may20_e.htm">massive dislocations</a>&nbsp;in international trade brought about by the coronavirus global pandemic.



In our view, of the three African contenders, none is better qualified than Okonjo-Iweala to lead the WTO in the next phase of its 25-year history, which is poised to be the most fractious and challenging.



The WTO plays an important confidence-building role in the global economy, and the interests of poor countries will be best served in a stronger multilateral trading system that is responsive to their development concerns.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What’s needed</h2>



The nature of the institution requires a leader with significant political heft and who commands the respect of all member countries, rich and poor.



The WTO’s director-general and secretariat wield&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wto.org/">very limited executive power</a>. They can inform, manage, coax and oversee. But they can’t decide. Decision-making in the WTO is consensus-driven, and any member country can scupper a trade deal.



This is unlike the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership">World Bank</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.imf.org/en/About">International Monetary Fund</a>, where decision-making is based on shareholding, which is dominated by industrialised nations.



Okonjo-Iweala is suitably qualified to serve at the helm of the institution. She is a Harvard-educated political heavy-hitter with the skill and experience to cajole, knock heads together and break logjams. She is regarded as a consensus builder who enjoys the confidence of governments, business and multilateral institutions. As Nigeria’s finance minister,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/africa-eyes-the-worlds-top-trade-job-wto-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-but-spars-over-its-candidate/">she successfully spearheaded </a>&nbsp;the negotiation of an $18 billion debt write-off for the country with the Paris Club creditor nations.



Her political acumen and extensive negotiating skills could contribute towards restoring the multilateral trade agenda. This has collapsed amid the Trump administration’s hostility towards multilateralism.



With her origins from a neutral developing country, she could be the right candidate the embattled WTO needs to broker a truce between the US and China and end their trade conflict, which has led to institutional collapse.



Okonjo-Iweala also boasts a credible track record of economic reform and political sway.



Following a long stint as a senior executive at the World Bank, she twice served as Nigeria’s finance minister between 2003 and 2015. During this period, she took on&nbsp;<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/africa-eyes-the-worlds-top-trade-job-wto-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-but-spars-over-its-candidate/">vested interests and implemented far-reaching reforms</a>. These included overhauling a corrupt fuel-subsidy scheme, cutting delays at the country’s ports, creating an oil fund to stabilise the economy, increasing transparency by publishing the government’s monthly finances, and introducing an electronic tax system that curbed illegal diversion of funds.



Okonjo-Iweala does not have WTO experience. But she knows and understands the workings of multilateral institutions, honed over many years as an international public servant. She is a seasoned global finance expert, economist and development practitioner with decades of international experience.



Her global finance expertise, in particular, would serve the WTO well given the nexus between trade and finance in the world economy, accentuated by the current economic crisis. By not being a WTO insider, she would bring a much-needed fresh perspective to the institution.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Crossroads</h2>



The WTO is at a crossroads. Since the launch of the Doha development agenda, it has been buffeted by one crisis after another. This has occurred at a time when the drivers of world trade have been undergoing seismic transformations, stemming from the ascent of new actors, notably China, the advent of new technologies and production methods, and changes in global demographics.



Compounding the institutional sclerosis has been the growing rivalry between the US and China, which has brought the institution to a halt.



In the absence of a multilateral architecture to govern trade, there has been a surge in tit-for-tat economic policies, which have&nbsp;<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/07/10/the-post-covid-19-world-economic-nationalism-triumphant/">disrupted supply chains and stifled trade and investment flows</a>.



These are desperate and perilous times for the WTO and they call for a credible and effective leader who is qualified to lead the institution at this critical point in its history. Okonjo-Iweala fits the bill. African countries must coalesce around and actively champion her candidacy.

WTO.

Why one of three African candidates fits the bill as the new head of the WTO

The International Labour Organisation&nbsp;<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/04/497132-new-un-report-finds-bulk-worlds-rural-populations-excluded-healthcare-access">estimated</a>&nbsp;in 2015 that 56% of people living in rural areas worldwide do not have access to essential healthcare services. And in Ghana today, rural people can’t always get basic healthcare like antenatal checkups and vaccinations, because there aren’t enough quality healthcare facilities or trained personnel.



Mobile technology offers ways to address these gaps. It can reduce costs and connect people to health care providers.



Mobile health, or m-health, involves the use of portable devices to create, share and store information to improve patient safety and care. It includes using mobile phone applications such as SMS, voice calling and wireless data transmission to collect or disseminate health-related information. And to offer direct care in the form of advice.



M-health solutions have been used to monitor cardiovascular patients in China and the US, for example. And in Japan and South Africa, m-health allows people in remote areas of the country to communicate via wireless networks to get timely information to manage their own health.



Ghana could be a good candidate for m-health services because of its large, medically underserved rural population and its uptake of mobile technology.



The World Bank&nbsp;<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=GH">reports</a>&nbsp;that Ghana had a rural population of nearly 44% in 2018. The&nbsp;<a href="https://healtheconomicsreview.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13561-016-0128-0">ratio of doctors</a>&nbsp;to patients in rural regions is about 1:18,257 compared to 1:4,099 in an urban region. In contrast to the scarcity of health personnel in rural Ghana, the country has the highest mobile penetration in West Africa and already outperforms many of its regional peers. By the end of 2019,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/blog/the-state-of-mobile-in-ghanas-tech-ecosystem/#:%7E:text=Ghana%20has%20the%20highest%20mobile,is%20at%2044.8%20per%20cent.&amp;text=There%20are%2013.1%20million%20active,million%20registered">mobile adoption</a>stood at 55%, higher than the regional average of 44.8%



This means a huge number of rural people could receive digital services. In our&nbsp;<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14783363.2018.1541734">study</a>, we explored how mobile health could be used or improved as part of the effort to broaden access to maternal health care for rural Ghanaians.



We developed a model to assess service quality in m-health. We wanted to know which aspects of service quality would influence user satisfaction and continued use of an m-health service.



Our study found that the quality of human interaction – in other words the person providing the service – had a positive and significant relationship with user satisfaction. We also established that people who are more vulnerable to health-related challenges might show much interest in health innovation such as m-health and might be more willing to continue to use the services than those who are healthy.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What we found</h2>



Ghana has seen a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.jmir.org/2019/2/e11268/">proliferation</a>&nbsp;of m-health programmes alongside increasing rates of phone usage in the population. At least 22 different projects have been piloted since 2004.



The women surveyed in our study used m-health services to monitor common pregnancy related issues like the rate of development of their babies and their own individual health.



To assess service quality we measured three dimensions: system quality (users’ perceptions of the technical level of communication); interaction quality (communication between service provider and consumer); and information quality (benefits of information services).



All three m-health quality dimensions were positive and significant on continual use. But we found that of the three m-health service quality dimensions – interaction quality – had the strongest relationship with user satisfaction. In other words, what mattered most to the women who used the service was communication with the service provider.



We found that more than the cost of acquiring a hand set and reliable mobile networks, the patience of health personnel in explaining health issues and helping the respondents to navigate same, was the most important determinant of user satisfaction. This result contrasted with a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225654619_Service_quality_of_mHealth_platforms_Development_and_validation_of_a_hierarchical_model_using_PLS">study</a>&nbsp;which found that all the service quality dimensions had a positive relationship with satisfaction.



We also found a significant relationship between user satisfaction and continual usage. Women who were satisfied with the service said they would continue to use it. Rural women who perceived m-health service costs (equipment and service access) as affordable also have a greater tendency to be satisfied and willing to continue using the system, in the absence of alternative care, than those who considered it expensive.



It could be argued that cost also contributes to continual usage and we found that the majority of the respondents (59%) were using shared phones from relatives and friends to access the services.



In spite of the importance of cost, we still conclude that what influences m-health quality, user satisfaction and usage the most is the human side of the service.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How to improve mobile health services</h2>



Policy makers and service providers can learn from our findings. We recommend that health personnel should deliver timely services and provide the right service the first time. They should provide information that is safe for maternal healthcare and customised to individuals.



Any additional cost such as an m-health service fee might discourage rural women from using the service. Policy makers and service providers should consider developing and deploying innovative m-health subsidy support schemes.



Finally, managers of m-health services must constantly identify the changing needs of their customers and continuously improve their services accordingly. The Ministry of Health and regional public sector health institutions could consider introducing or strengthening customer service units to oversee m-health programmes.



Service providers should also remember that societal needs change over time. Users’ desire for quality and preferences in technology services might change as they become more exposed to information technology and competitors’ services.

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Mobile health services can help in rural Ghana if they have the human touch

An analysis of financial inclusion in South Africa shows that affordability limits poor households’ access to formal financial services.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.african-review.com/view-paper.php?serial=20200501144727-278204">In our study</a>, which looked at people’s use of financial goods and services between 2008 and 2015, we found that there was a general increase in use. But this was severely skewed to households with higher incomes.



Financial inclusion is broadly defined as the ability of people to access a range of affordable financial services. Among these are bank and savings accounts, loans and insurance products. Households that are financially excluded can’t take part in various forms of savings or wealth accumulation. These range from paying bills via direct debit to gaining favourable forms of credit.



The key policy implication of our findings is that more financial services should target low-income households. It should be a priority, given the high rate of exclusion among the poor.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Measuring use based on income</h2>



In general, there are four dimensions of financial inclusion: access, usage, quality and welfare. In our study, we focus on usage.



The financial services available in South Africa range from the well-known ones such as bank accounts and credit cards to the less well known ones such as hire purchase agreements and loans with “mashonisa” (loan sharks). In the South African context, a bank account remains the most used financial service. The number of unbanked adult individuals decreased from 17 million to 14 million between&nbsp;<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1813-6982.2004.tb00127.x">2003</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&amp;PPN=P0318&amp;SCH=7348">2017</a>.



Our study is the first to thoroughly investigate the data from the&nbsp;<a href="http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/images/documents/what-is-NIDS.pdf">National Income Dynamics Study</a>. This study interviews the same households (if possible) every two years to track the changes in their income and non-income welfare over time.



One standout feature of the study is that it asks household heads about their usage of 14 financial services.



With the aid of some statistical techniques, we developed an aggregate financial usage index to investigate the profile of people who were comprehensively financially included.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What we found</h2>



The study found that the increased use of financial products and services was mostly associated with higher income households. The other characteristics of individuals and households that showed higher usage of financial services were: middle-aged, male, white, more educated, urban residents in Western Cape and Gauteng provinces. They came from bigger households with more employed members.



The likelihood of complete financial exclusion was more prevalent in poor rural households living in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo provinces. Almost invariably, these households were made up of black people. The study also found that households with low real per capita income and fewer employed members were associated with greater likelihood of financial exclusion. Households bigger in size and headed by middle-aged people were associated with significantly higher financial inclusion and lower likelihood of complete financial exclusion.



The table below presents the proportion of households with at least one adult member having some form of the observed financial services. The results indicate that there has been an increase in the use of most financial services between waves 1 (2008) and 4 (2014/2015). In particular, the proportion of households that have at least one member with a bank account increased from almost 57% in wave 1 (2008) to over 78% by wave 4 (2014/2015), while those with a personal loan from a bank nearly doubled (8.63% to 16.41%) between the first (2008) and last waves (2014/2015).



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343724/original/file-20200624-132965-1igt05z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343724/original/file-20200624-132965-1igt05z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt=""/></a><figcaption>Proportion of households with at least one adult having some form of financial services.&nbsp;Author supplied</figcaption></figure>



We also considered variables from informal financial sources, such as loans from mashonisa (loan sharks), which have increased from 1.69% in wave 1 to 2.97% in wave 4, and loans from a family member, friend or employer, which increased from less than 2.85% to 8.76%. The use of other important services, such as hire purchase agreements, store cards and pension or retirement annuity plans, also increased across the four waves. There is a decrease in the use of some of the major financial services. For example, households where at least one member reported to have a home loan or bond were at 8.63% in wave 1 and gradually declined over the years, ending up at 5.68% by wave 4. There was also a slight decline in study loans and vehicle finance.



One finance source that particularly stands out is the use of credit cards, which decreased from 12.5% (wave 1) to 9.74% (wave 4).



In all four waves, households that were regarded as poor had relatively lower rates of use of each source of finance.



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343725/original/file-20200624-132972-1objgy2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343725/original/file-20200624-132972-1objgy2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt=""/></a><figcaption>Poor households had relatively lower rates of use.</figcaption></figure>



The figure below shows the proportion of households that were completely financially excluded (they didn’t have any of the 14 sources of finance). It more than halved between the first (36.77%) and fourth (16.40%) waves.



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343726/original/file-20200624-133013-1gs2ib7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343726/original/file-20200624-133013-1gs2ib7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt=""/></a><figcaption>Proportion of households completely financially excluded.</figcaption></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What next?</h2>



Supporting alternative, black finance access and usage is one possibility. This may range from low-cost bank accounts and products to advanced technologies that deliver financial services to the excluded in a swift, affordable and efficient manner.



Other countries can be used as a case study.



For instance, in India, the government and private providers have worked together to grow access to financial products such as insurance at a lower cost. The Indian government founded a social security fund that finances insurance companies to subsidise insurance premium policies offered to poorer households. This initiative has provided over&nbsp;<a href="https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/ShowRessource.action;jsessionid=yWZDNJblhn3GOxUg9oeY_m7VGnYmb9h-NN-Q5AjRJKXqpxrTDEzf!-1463413688?lang=EN&amp;ressource.ressourceId=7533">two million poor Indians with access to insurance policies</a>.



The promotion of money pools is also another option.&nbsp;<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1007/s12114-013-9171-9">A study</a>&nbsp;conducted from five Caribbean countries showed that money pools, where poor people pool their money and create collective banks, helped people save. In Cameroon, the practice of lending and saving through kinship and financial networks was found to be more trusted than the mainstream.



This clearly calls for a proactive financial system that promotes such channels and one that is trusted by the general public, especially low-income earners.



But financial inclusion initiatives directed at the poor should be closely monitored. This is because&nbsp;<a href="https://developingeconomics.org/2019/07/31/misunderstanding-the-average-impact-of-microcredit/">they don’t always have a positive impact</a>, particularly on poor people.

Informal_settlement_where_people_now_have_community_ablution_blocks_(8152040443)

South African banks need to do more to ensure financial inclusion

The World Health Organisation (WHO) recently&nbsp;<a href="https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conference-15th-may--2020.pdf?sfvrsn=cae39150_2">noted</a>&nbsp;that “researchers are working at break-neck speed” to understand SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19). They are also working to develop potential vaccines, medicines and other technologies that are affordable and equitable. By June 2020 – six months since it was first identified – thousands of therapeutic trials and dozens of vaccine development studies were&nbsp;<a href="https://clinicaltrials.gov/">under way</a>, including one vaccine study each in&nbsp;<a href="https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-06/uotw-fcv062320.php">South Africa</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/nigerian-researchers-announce-covid-19-vaccine/1883955">Nigeria</a>.



As a public health specialist and infectious diseases epidemiologist, I am very happy and impressed to see such massive research activity to relieve human suffering from this baffling disease. But then, as an African, I ask myself, when will these treatments or vaccines be available for Africans on African soil? Will the “break-neck speed”, “affordability” and “equity” work for the benefit of Africa?



It is true that African countries are making their own efforts to fight the pandemic. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is building on its&nbsp;<a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/building-ebola-response-tackle-covid-19-drc">Ebola response</a>&nbsp;to tackle COVID-19;&nbsp;<a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/walvis-bay-covid-19-strategy-test-isolate-and-treat">Namibia</a>&nbsp;is working hard on a “test-isolate-treat” strategy; and Nigeria is turning hospitals into COVID-19 treatment centres and calling on&nbsp;<a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/volunteering-nigerias-covid-19-battle">volunteer nurses</a>&nbsp;to close the gap in health professionals. The WHO is also supporting the COVID-19 response in the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/who-response-in-countries">African region</a>, particularly in logistics and the capacity of health and multidisciplinary experts.



But the history of pandemic or epidemic diseases is not encouraging. It shows that treatments and vaccines have been accessible to African countries only after the loss of millions of lives and typically years – sometimes decades – after developed nations have benefited from them. This is mainly because the treatments and vaccines for most diseases are produced in Western countries and are too expensive for African countries. This largely remains in place as the chief barrier to accessibility of treatments and vaccines.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What history tells us</h2>



The timelines, affordability and equity of providing services to manage tuberculosis (TB) and HIV illustrate the above point.



The scientist Robert Koch discovered Mycobacterium tuberculosis, the bacteria that causes TB, in&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5432783/">1882</a>. TB become an epidemic disease in Africa a decade later. And it is still a public health threat on the continent. By&nbsp;<a href="https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/tuberculosis-tb">2016</a>, there were 2.5 million infections and 420,000 deaths.



TB treatment in the US and Europe was introduced in&nbsp;<a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12168751/">1944</a>. But Africa only started receiving the treatment in the early 1970s, nearly three decades later. The drugs were&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1936956/#B20,">very expensive</a>&nbsp;and African countries couldn’t afford to import them.



It was the same with the TB vaccine,&nbsp;<a href="https://erj.ersjournals.com/content/20/36_suppl/87S">BCG</a>. European and American babies started receiving it in the&nbsp;<a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24023600/">1920s</a>. South Africans had to wait more than&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2869300/">50 years</a>. The vaccine was too expensive and international donors needed several years to rally support for political and economic reasons.



Similarly, antiretroviral therapy (ART) for HIV came to Africa in the early&nbsp;<a href="https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-7-33">21st century</a>, roughly a decade after it was available in the&nbsp;<a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22706009/">developed West</a>. By then the problem was far worse in Africa, despite some fragmented prevention efforts. The&nbsp;<a href="https://ourworldindata.org/hiv-aids">death rate</a>&nbsp;in the 1990s was 100-200 per 100,000 in Africa but only 5-10 per 100,000 in Europe. As of&nbsp;<a href="https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/hivaids">2018</a>, HIV infected 25.7 million and killed 0.47 million Africans.



The price of ART drugs eventually&nbsp;<a href="https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/7/08-058925/en/">declined</a>&nbsp;because of higher purchase volumes, more producers and the availability of generics.



A strategy of testing for and treating HIV was launched in the US in&nbsp;<a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22895503/">2010</a>, and only six years&nbsp;<a href="https://www.who.int/hiv/pub/arv/arv-2016/en/">later</a>&nbsp;in parts of Africa. Test-and-treat programmes are still not&nbsp;<a href="https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-7-33">available</a>&nbsp;in all African countries because of poor infrastructure, shortages of trained professionals and other reasons. ART is still&nbsp;<a href="https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/7/08-058925/en/">expensive</a>&nbsp;for African countries but has been supported by international donors. Some NGOs that were central to the treatment strategy are handing it over to local governments.



Generally, treatments and vaccines for almost all diseases are developed outside Africa and take years to arrive in low-income countries, which cannot initially afford them. When they do arrive there may be other problems, such as lack of infrastructure to distribute the treatments and deliver vaccines, and lack of skilled health workers to provide the care. The people in need may not take up the available services widely. Modern and traditional healthcare provision aren’t always integrated in ways that enhance health-seeking behaviour.



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Remaining obstacles</h2>



In addition to the long and complex process of trial research, there are several factors that complicate access to future COVID-19 treatments and vaccines.



First, the traditional donors to African countries themselves are&nbsp;<a href="https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/">hard-hit</a>&nbsp;by the virus and many are at the brink of deep economic recession, if not depression. Therefore they may not be able to contribute readily to directly supporting Africa’s health systems, subsidising drugs or strengthening existing partnerships between countries and institutions.



Second, the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/29/trump-us-terminate-who-relationship/">withdrawal</a>&nbsp;of US financial support for the WHO, one of the major supporters of Africa, will most certainly be felt. US allies could also revise their contribution and thereby destabilise the institution. And there could be a disconnect between US scholars and the WHO, to the detriment of Africa.



Third, many African governments may not be able to afford the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.msf.org/access-high-vaccine-prices-hamper-immunisation-efforts-africa-are-missing-agenda-key-vaccination">cost</a>&nbsp;of a COVID-19 vaccine.



Fourth, there are ongoing&nbsp;<a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rise-displacement-africa">conflicts</a>&nbsp;and displacement of people in the region, which will challenge access.



<hr class="wp-block-separator"/>



Read more:&nbsp;<a href="https://theconversation.com/governments-need-to-do-more-for-refugees-affected-by-coronavirus-heres-how-135861">Governments need to do more for refugees affected by coronavirus: here&#8217;s how</a>



<hr class="wp-block-separator"/>



Fifth, the region has poor&nbsp;<a href="https://www.raconteur.net/business-innovation/africa-lack-infrastructure-leaves-millions-poverty-despite-potential">infrastructure</a>&nbsp;and a shortage of&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1239980/">health workers</a>&nbsp;to distribute treatments or vaccines.



So, to manage the COVID-19 crisis, Africa must learn from the history of HIV, TB and other&nbsp;<a href="https://theconversation.com/investing-in-health-systems-is-the-only-way-to-stop-the-next-ebola-outbreak-124957">outbreaks</a>. A delayed introduction of treatments and vaccines should not be repeated. And countries should first do all they can to&nbsp;<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-can-get-covid-19-under-control-if-it-blocks-the-routes-that-enable-transmission-140792">prevent</a>&nbsp;the crisis.

sars-cov-2-5090264_960_720

Africa waited for solutions to past health crises: will it be different for COVID-19?

<figure><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343219/original/file-20200622-54985-15pc17f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption>A warning sign advising users to be aware of their surroundings while playing a video game. 
Stefan Heunis/AFP via Getty Images
</figcaption></figure>
Six years ago, a <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/cashless/">cashless policy</a> became fully operational in Nigeria. The aim was to encourage electronic transactions with a view to reducing the amount of physical cash in the economy. The logic was that this would minimise the risk of cash-related crimes.
But a major downside of the policy has been <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2019/10/24/fraud-cases-hit-major-payment-channels-across-nigerian-banks/">pervasive</a> electronic banking fraud (e-fraud). Although the cashless banking system was designed to foster transparency, curb corruption and drive financial inclusion, it’s threatened by the growing perpetration of fraud.
<a href="https://ndic.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/NDIC-2018-ANNUAL-REPORT.pdf">About N15.5 billion</a> was lost to bank fraud in 2018. About 60% of the fraud was perpetrated online owing to available internet-based and tech-rated banking services.
Our <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0306624X20928028">research</a> investigated dimensions of electronic fraud in Nigeria. We found three: internal fraud carried out by banking staff; external fraud carried out by ordinary Nigerians; and collaboration between fraudsters and banking staff.
We found that inefficient supervision, non-performance of oversight by regional heads of banks, and poor follow-up on customers’ addresses (Know Your Customer) accounted for the fraud that took place.
Our study provides the banking industry, banking public and investors with critical pointers on how to reduce fraud.
<h2>Different types</h2>
Our study involved collecting data as well as conducting interviews with 30 people. These included victims of bank fraud, bank customers who did not subscribe to the cashless policy and fraud detectives at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).
These were the common patterns we uncovered.
Insider fraud: By insider, we mean those working with banks or those in a relationship with account holders. Here, the fraud was exclusively executed by members of staff in the banking system who exploited the strategic position they held in the system and their grasp of how it works. Banking institutions and customers were their victims.
An example we came across during our research was the case of a N90 million (US$452,261) fraud perpetrated by an account officer of a major eatery in Lagos State. The job of this account officer was to collect the eatery’s takings and deposit them at the bank. A fraud detective told us that:
<blockquote>As the account officer he would collect money on a daily basis and was expected to credit the company’s account. However, he would collect money on Monday and lodge it and collect on Tuesday and not lodge it. He was missing one day out. He did this continuously until he was able to rake in N90 million. At this time, when the eatery management raised the alarm on their account, he ran away and could not be found. We however used his sister to arrest him. We were only able to recover N8 million naira from him. He had used part of the money to organise his wedding, had a baby and almost completed a four-bedroom bungalow at another area in Lagos.</blockquote>
Bank fraud is often successful because many Nigerians don’t subscribe to transaction alerts. The eatery management trusted their account officer but did not know that he was dishonest.
Outsider fraud: These perpetrators were external to the banking system. They thrived on their internet skills and sometimes on their understanding of the victims’ routine and identity.
An example we came across was the fraudulent use of <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2017/BPSD/Circular%20on%20the%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%20BVN%20%20Watchlist%20for%20Nigerian%20Financial%20System.pdf">bank verification numbers</a> (BVN). These were made compulsory by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2014. All bank account holders had to undertake biometric registration. The intention was to ensure security and check fraud.
But fraudsters have found a way to cheat the system by sending bank customers false emails asking for their bank verification details. As one victim explained to us:
<blockquote>I needed to make some transactions and I headed for my bank. I had called my account officer ahead of time. On getting to the bank, I connected my computer and got a mail from a supposed same bank. I was asked to click on a link and supply my BVN details for update of my account or face service suspension on the account. I just clicked the link and supplied my details and behold, N1 million debit alert came on my phone within five minutes! I was shocked and devastated but before we could do anything they had withdrawn everything.</blockquote>
Collaborative fraud: This involved collaboration between bank staff and fraudsters outside the banking system. Banks and individual account holders were the victims. For example, bank staff could provide account details of customers to the collaborating fraudster.
<h2>Governance gaps</h2>
Despite this weak governance architecture, which is still not fraud proof, bank executives reported having in place mechanisms which had limited the incidence of fraud. One was sending out information to customers who subscribed to electronic alerts. Through this, banks contact and send anti-fraud messages to their customers.
Owing to reputational risk, banks try to refrain from public prosecution of erring staff. We found that banks adopted shaming as a mechanism for instilling discipline within their organisations while attempting to ease out “bad eggs” through flagging of their images on computers and across the banking industry.
There is a need to check fraud through customer awareness and financial literacy education.
While fraudsters continue to design new ways of working on customers’ vulnerabilities, Nigerian banks need to use the <a href="http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/legislations/STATUTES/CYBERCRIME%20ACT%202015.pdf">Cybercrime Act </a> to prosecute offenders as a way to boost confidence in the banking sector and deter fraud in the future.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important;" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141141/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/oludayo-tade-244002">Oludayo Tade</a>, Researcher in criminology, victimology, electronic frauds and cybercrime, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-ibadan-1955">University of Ibadan</a>
This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/electronic-banking-fraud-in-nigeria-how-its-done-and-what-can-be-done-to-stop-it-141141">original article</a>.

Electronic banking fraud in Nigeria: how it’s done, and what can be done to stop it

<figure>
 <img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339991/original/file-20200605-176546-gdqw9h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip"><figcaption>
 The demand of power in West Africa is rising 
Sebastian Sterl 
</figcaption></figure>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sebastian-sterl-1110829">Sebastian Sterl</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/vrije-universiteit-brussel-2958">Vrije Universiteit Brussel</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/robert-brecha-1095031">Robert Brecha</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-dayton-1726">University of Dayton</a>
Not too long ago, when the idea of solar and wind energy was still hotly debated, critics used to point out the limitations of these energy sources: the sun doesn’t always shine and the wind doesn’t always blow. But nowadays <a href="https://www.resilience.org/stories/2018-05-24/a-100-renewable-grid-isnt-just-feasible-its-already-happening/">many countries’</a> electricity grids are strongly supplied by renewable energy.
The challenge in creating flexible, reliable and affordable energy supply systems with renewables lies in the very different circumstances across countries and regions. Planning and expanding renewable power must consider countries’ local resources and their existing and planned infrastructure. This becomes even more interesting for countries trying to grow their grids and expand their renewables at the same time – like many in sub-Saharan Africa.
One technology that has the flexibility to complement solar and wind power production is hydropower. It can be used as a constant source of electricity, but also compensate for fluctuations in other sources. But it does need to be properly planned and managed if it’s to be sustainable.
Since power generation infrastructure lasts for 30 to 50 years, decisions taken today will to a large extent determine whether governments can meet their <a href="https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx">climate targets</a>.
Across West Africa, many countries grapple with the challenge of rising electricity demand. At the same time, climate change impacts, mostly caused by fossil fuel combustion, are having a heavy impact on the region’s <a href="https://climateanalytics.org/projects/impact-climate-action/west-africa/">weather patterns</a> and potentially <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-32736-0">agricultural yields</a>.
Can increased electricity generation be harmonised with climate change objectives?
Our <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-020-0539-0">research</a> shows that combining sustainably managed hydropower plants with new solar and wind power projects is a promising option for the West African region. It could minimise the use of fossil fuels and their negative climate change impacts as the region seeks to expand access to affordable electricity.
<h2>West African Power Pool</h2>
Countries in West Africa have different renewable energy potentials. <a href="http://www.ecowrex.org/mapView/index.php?lang=eng&amp;mclayers=layerGHI">Solar potential</a> exists nearly everywhere. <a href="http://www.ecowrex.org/mapView/index.php?lang=eng&amp;mclayers=layerResWind">Wind potential</a> is strongest along coastal areas and in the northern, drier part of the region. Hydropower potential is mostly concentrated in the southern part of the region, which receives the <a href="http://www.ecowrex.org/mapView/index.php?lang=eng&amp;mclayers=layerCatchment2">most rainfall</a>.
Many countries already use large hydropower plants, such as Ghana’s Akosombo dam, and many new dams are in the planning. <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/industry-sectors/renewable-energy/burkina-faso-unveil-zagtouli-solar-power-plant/">Solar</a> and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/25/africa/west-africas-largest-wind-plant/index.html">wind</a> power are more recent additions.
Cross-border electricity trade could make better use of all this hydropower, coupled with solar and wind. A common power pool, allowing countries to share their resources, could increase reliable, renewable power supply by as much as 60%, according to our research.
The diagram below, based on our paper, illustrates an example of countries’ potential contributions to such a power pool.
<figure class="align-center ">
 <img decoding="async" alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338707/original/file-20200531-78885-nw40o1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338707/original/file-20200531-78885-nw40o1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=563&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338707/original/file-20200531-78885-nw40o1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=563&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338707/original/file-20200531-78885-nw40o1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=563&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338707/original/file-20200531-78885-nw40o1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=707&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338707/original/file-20200531-78885-nw40o1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=707&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338707/original/file-20200531-78885-nw40o1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=707&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"><figcaption>
 Each West African country could contribute to a shared West African Power Pool for electricity supply, based on its own nationally available resources. Picture provided by the authors.
</figcaption></figure>
West African countries do already collaborate on electricity exchanges, but mostly through bilateral contracts. The <a href="http://www.ecowapp.org/">West African Power Pool</a>, a regional agency, is planning to integrate the national power systems into a unified electricity market on a larger scale. Our research shows how these efforts could be streamlined with the growth of renewable electricity sources.
Similar efforts are under way in other parts of the world, such as the European Union, where <a href="https://www.pv-magazine.com/2020/05/28/final-call-for-feedback-on-eu-rules-for-renewables-financing/">cross-border cooperation</a> is also expected to become more important to scale up renewable electricity generation.
<h2>Benefits for health, costs and ecology</h2>
In our paper, we use a new <a href="https://github.com/VUB-HYDR/REVUB">model</a> to examine the synergies of sustainable hydropower generation with solar and wind power in West Africa. The model shows how to manage these sources in combination.
We show that the region can use hydropower, rather than natural gas plants, to ensure grid reliability while increasing solar and wind power. Natural gas is often touted as a bridging fuel in the transition to sustainable energy. But global emissions need to be around zero by mid-century according to the <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/">Paris Agreement</a>. Building more gas infrastructure therefore risks missing climate goals.
The negative impacts on health from <a href="https://e360.yale.edu/digest/air-pollution-from-fossil-fuels-costs-8-billion-per-day-new-research-finds">air pollution</a> resulting from burning fossil fuels are also well known. This can be avoided by investing in renewable energy.
We argue that the cost of renewable electricity over a plant’s lifetime is likely to soon become <a href="https://irena.org/publications/2020/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2019">significantly cheaper</a> than for fossil fuels. This is primarily thanks to decreases in solar <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-photovoltaic-solar-energy-12924">photovoltaic</a> costs.
<h2>The way forward</h2>
Our paper shows one way to start the renewable transition for West Africa is by optimising the use of local solar, wind and water resources while keeping an eye on sustainability criteria. For instance, our methodology ensures that hydropower lake levels and downstream river flows remain within acceptable boundaries. It also underlines the possibility of replacing future hydropower plants with solar and wind.
This will increase the overall ecological sustainability of renewable power generation.
Taken together, such measures will help to pave the way for a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148120304109">long-term transition</a> towards solar PV-based power systems, supported by wind, hydropower, and battery storage.
Our study framework is not limited to West Africa. It can be used for other regions that depend heavily on hydropower and also seek to increase solar and wind power generation.
West African countries are not yet locked in to large, integrated power grid infrastructure designed for plants powered by fossil fuels, as is the case in Europe and North America. The region can plan its future grids around renewables from the outset. It’s an opportunity to leapfrog old technologies – one which other parts of the world have never had.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139521/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important">
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sebastian-sterl-1110829">Sebastian Sterl</a>, Researcher, Climate Services for Renewable Energy, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/vrije-universiteit-brussel-2958">Vrije Universiteit Brussel</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/robert-brecha-1095031">Robert Brecha</a>, Professor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-dayton-1726">University of Dayton</a>
This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-west-africa-can-expand-power-supply-and-meet-climate-goals-139521">original article</a>.

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How West Africa can expand power supply and meet climate goals

<figure>
 <img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339739/original/file-20200604-67377-d57q25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip"><figcaption>
 President Ramaphosa’s government is easing the lockdown because of unsustainable economic costs. 
Getty Images 
</figcaption></figure>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sean-mfundza-muller-298216">Seán Mfundza Muller</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a>
When President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the decision to implement an initial 21-day national lockdown in response to the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, he referred to “modelling” on which the decision was based. A <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/exclusive-the-terrifying-coronavirus-projections-that-pushed-government-into-lockdown-action-20200319">media report</a> a few days later based on leaked information claimed that the government had been told that “a slow and inadequate response by government to the outbreak could result in anywhere between 87,900 and 351,000 deaths”. These estimates, the report said, were based on, respectively, population infection rates of 10% to 40%.
In late April, the chair of the health minister’s advisory committee sub-committee on public health <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2020-04-24-sas-covid-19-models-were-flawed-says-former-nicd-expert/">referred to the early models</a> used by the government as “back-of-the-envelope calculations”, saying they were “flawed and illogical and made wild assumptions”.
These assertions have been impossible to fully assess. This is because no official information on the modelling has ever been released – despite its apparently critical role.
A <a href="https://sacoronavirus.co.za/2020/04/13/sas-covid-19-epidemic-trends-next-steps/">briefing by the chair</a> of the health minister’s advisory committee in mid-April sketched some basic details of what the government’s health advisors believed about the likely peak and timing of the epidemic. But no details were given on expected infections, hospital admissions or deaths.
A spokesperson for the presidency <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2020-05-10-government-keeping-information-on-virus-under-wraps-to-avoid-covid-19-panic/">said that</a> government was withholding such numbers “to avoid panic”.
Finally, towards the end of May the health minister hosted an engagement between journalists and some of the modellers government was relying on. It then <a href="https://www.nicd.ac.za/diseases-a-z-index/covid-19/surveillance-reports/">started releasing</a> details of the models and projections.
The predictions of these models for an “optimistic scenario” are that the vast majority of the population will be infected, there will be a peak of 8 million infections in mid-August and in total there will be 40,000 deaths.
To understand the significance of these – and the previous numbers – it is useful to consider more broadly what models are and how they are being used in the current context.
<h2>What models are and how they are used</h2>
A theoretical model – whether in epidemiology, economics or even physics – is a simplified representation of how the modeller thinks the world works.
To produce estimates or forecasts of how things might play out in the real world, such models need to make assumptions about the strength of relationships between different variables. Those assumptions reflect some combination of the modeller’s beliefs, knowledge and available evidence.
To put it differently: modelling is sophisticated guesswork. Where models have been successfully used across different contexts and time periods we can have more confidence in their accuracy and reliability.
But models, especially outside sciences like physics, are almost always wrong to some degree. What matters for decision-making is that they are “right enough”. In the current situation, the difference between predicting 35,000 and 40,000 deaths probably won’t change policy decisions, but 5,000 or 500,000 instead of 40,000 might.
In the case of South Africa’s COVID-19 response, available information indicates that epidemiological models have played two main roles.
First, they have provided predictions of the possible scale of death and illness relative to health system capacity, as well as how this is expected to play out over time.
Second, they have been used to assess the success and effects of the government’s intervention strategies.
There are reasons to believe that there have been significant failures in both cases, in the modelling itself and especially in the way that it has been used.
In recent weeks, the government and its advisors have been keen to emphasise the uncertainty of the modelling predictions. From a methodological point of view, that is the responsible stance. But it’s too little too late.
Modelling COVID-19 is <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-weve-had-imperial-oxford-and-many-more-models-but-none-can-have-all-the-answers-135137">challenging in general</a>, but there are at least four additional reasons to be cautious about our COVID-19 models.
<h2>Reasons for caution</h2>
First, certain key characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 remain unknown and the subject of debate among medical experts.
Second, unlike some countries, South Africa does not have detailed data on the dynamics of social interactions and the models presented so far do not use household survey data as a proxy. Nuanced questions therefore aren’t addressed. For example, most cases early on in the epidemic appeared to have been relatively wealthy travellers. But there was no way to model the consequences of domestic workers being exposed by their employers and thereby infecting others in their (poorer) communities. So the structure of South Africa’s models is high level and does not account for country-specific factors.
Third, the values for the parameters of the models (representing the strength of relationships between different factors) are being taken from evidence in other countries. They may not actually be the same in South Africa.
Finally, the unsystematic nature of aspects of the government’s approach to testing, such as through its community screening programme, makes it much harder to infer the effects of its interventions.
<h2>Unclear objectives</h2>
There is little reason to believe that government had anything other than good intentions. Nevertheless, the consequences of its lack of sophistication in using evidence and expertise may burden an entire generation of South Africans.
A major problem linked to the combination of excessive confidence and secrecy is that the government’s strategy was never clear: although it referred to “flattening the curve” it never stated what its specific objectives were. In the terms of <a href="https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk:8443/handle/10044/1/77482">the most influential modelling-based advice</a> during the pandemic, was its strategy “suppression” or “mitigation”?
The government and its advisors have made much of the fact that the lockdown probably delayed the peak of the epidemic. But there is no evidence so far that this was worth the cost – since most of the population is expected to be infected anyway.
One key claim is that the lockdown bought the country time to prepare the health system.
The <a href="http://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/handle/10044/1/77482">Imperial model</a> defined the primary objective of “flattening the curve” as reducing ICU admissions below the number of critical care beds. On that dimension, the government’s own modellers predict a peak of 20,000 critical cases in the optimistic scenario and only about 4,000 ICU beds with little increase from the pre-lockdown numbers. By this definition, it has failed dismally.
There appears to have been more success with securing supplies of personal protective equipment, quarantine locations, overflow beds and some ventilators. But there is also little evidence that many of those small gains could not have been achieved without such a costly lockdown.
Given this, it is concerning that many academics and commentators have praised the success of government’s strategy. This has included the Academy of Sciences, which <a href="https://www.assaf.org.za/index.php/news/626-public-statement-on-covid19">has asserted</a> that “strong, science-based governmental leadership has saved many lives, for which South Africa can be thankful”.
This is entirely unsubstantiated.
First, the full toll of the epidemic will be experienced over time and so it is possible to have fewer deaths at the outset due to a policy intervention being exceeded by a larger number of deaths later because of the limitations of that same policy intervention.
Second, the only way to substantiate such claims would be to use models of different scenarios. But we’ve seen that the early models were not credible and the subsequent ones are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. It seems that the government <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/lockdown-and-other-interventions-potentially-saved-20-000-lives-top-scientist-20200513">and some of its advisors</a> want to have the best of both worlds: they want to use dramatically incorrect predictions by early models to claim success of their interventions. This is misleading and does not meet the most basic standards by which academics in quantitative disciplines establish causal effects of policy interventions.
In an <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-the-cure-could-be-worse-than-the-disease-for-south-africa-134436">earlier article</a>, I noted that “if the current lockdown fails to drastically curb transmission, which is possible, it would layer one disaster on another … the country may exhaust various resources by the time the potentially more dangerous winter period arrives”.
This appears to be the situation in which South Africa finds itself.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140002/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important">
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sean-mfundza-muller-298216">Seán Mfundza Muller</a>, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Research Associate at the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (PEERC) and Visiting Fellow at the Johannesburg Institute of Advanced Study (JIAS), <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a>
This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-use-of-covid-19-modelling-has-been-deeply-flawed-heres-why-140002">original article</a>.

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